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Articles
DIFFERENCE AND DEFERENCE IN TREATY INTERPRETATION
ALEX GLASHAUSSER*

I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HE Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides that when a

citizen of one country is arrested in another, authorities "shall inform
the person concerned without delay of his rights" to inform his consulate
of the arrest.' The U.S. Department of State has interpreted the conven2
tion as conferring no privately enforceable right on foreign nationals.
Some courts have deferred to that interpretation in reaching the same
result. 3 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, individuals may or may not
have a private right of action, but regardless, the convention allows federal
law to preclude a foreign national from raising such a claim in a petition
for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner failed to develop the claim in
4
state court.
The International Court of Justice has disagreed on both counts. In
two cases, it has held not only that prisoners have a private right of action
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. B.A., 1990,
Harvard University; J.D., 1995, Duke University School of Law. I would like to
thank Ali Khan for a series of helpful conversations about this article, Peter
Cotorceanu for his incisive comments on a draft, and Alison Lee for her devoted
research assistance. This article was supported by generous grants from Washburn
University School of Law.
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, para.
1(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Consular Convention].
2. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2000) (en banc). In Li,
the First Circuit requested an opinion from the State Department about how to
interpret the Consular Convention. See id. at 63 ("We first consult the United
States Department of State's interpretation of the [treaty], to which we accord substantial deference."). The department responded that the convention "establish[es] state-to-state rights and obligations" and does not "establish[ I rights of
individuals." Id. (quoting Department of State Answers to Questions Posed by First
Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li at A-3, United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st
Cir. 2000) (No. 97-2034)). The State Department has taken the same position
before the International Court ofJustice. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, Verbatim Record 98/7 (Apr. 7),
3.19-3.20, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.
htm (statement ofJohn Crook, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs,
United States Department of State) (finding "absolutely no support" in Consular
Convention for claim of private right of action).
3. E.g., Li, 206 F.3d at 63-64 (describing and relying on convention interpretation); State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 273-74 (N.M. 2001) (explaining
treaty interpretation).
4. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (explaining that under
Vienna Convention claim can be defaulted by failing to raise issue in state court).

(25)
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under the convention, 5 but also that countries may not override that right
through procedural default rules such as that invoked by the Supreme
Court. 6 Three times, it has provisionally ordered the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal" to ensure that prisoners asserting rights
under the convention are not executed before a final judgment of the
International Court in cases brought on their behalf.7 The Supreme
Court has refused to take any such measures, and when given the opportunity in later cases, it has declined to rethink its substantive stance as to the
8
meaning of the Consular Convention.
Two courts, each of which is in some sense "supreme." Two different
judicial interpretations of the same treaty. A natural question is, which is
correct? A less obvious, but no less important, question is whether one of
them is necessarily wrong. It is tempting to say that when two tribunals
disagree on the same issue, one (or both) must be wrong. But that need
not be the case. If there is any type of legal document that legitimately
can be interpreted in contradictory ways, it is treaties.
International agreements (which I will generally refer to as "treaties,"
in the broad sense of that term 9 ) are protean instruments, both legal and
5. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igusijudgment20
010625.htm (stating that text of Article 36 of Vienna Convention "creates individual rights"); Case Conceming Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128, 40 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-ij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusjudgment/imusimusjudgment_- 20040331.pdf (citing LaGrand in finding individual rights under Article 36 of Vienna Convention).
6. See LaGrand,2001 I.C.J. at 497-98 (noting that procedural default rule is
problematic when it prevents "person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance"); Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128 at 1 112-114 (noting that application of procedural default rule may prevent rights under Article 36 from being given "full effect").
7. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3), available at http:/
/www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICJ/1999/1.html; Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9); see also Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 59 (Feb. 5), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus-iorder_2003
0205.PDF (ordering United States to "take all measures necessary").
8. See, e.g., Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (denying writ of certiorari).
9. Though agreements between intergovernmental organizations are sometimes referred to as "treaties," my use of the term is generally limited to agreements between sovereigns. Likewise, this article focuses not on quasi-private
international agreements, such as purely commercial ones, but rather on the sort
of agreements that by their nature arise only between nation-states. See, e.g., 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

1108 (John P.

Kaminski & GaspareJ. Saladino eds., 1990) (quotingJames Monroe's statement at
Virginia Convention that power to regulate "commerce" was distinct from power to
regulate "treaties"). Moreover, my analysis does not turn on distinctions that are
important in other contexts, such as that between (1) treaties in the constitutional
sense of documents requiring the advice and consent of the Senate and (2) treaties in the international sense that would include, for example, congressional-executive agreements. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAw 256 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing executive agreements); Bruce

Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARV. L. REv. 799, 802
(1995) (discussing congressional-executive agreements).
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diplomatic, that to some extent can reflect the eye of the beholder. Divergent institutional forces influencing the Supreme Court and the International Court make occasional disagreements inevitable, but both courts
can be correct, because the interpretation of treaties can legitimately depend on the identity of the interpreter. As a result, neither court has reason to defer to the other. Each, however, should be open to the other's
views as potentially persuasive.
The Consular Convention cases also raise the question of whether
multiple interpretations of the same treaty can coexist within a single nation. Should courts in the United States defer to the views of the executive
branch in the interest of facilitating foreign policy? Or might the distinct
institutional role of the judiciary encourage dissent? I argue that just as
interpretation of the same treaty provision can vary between domestic and
international courts, it can vary across interpreters within a single government; thus, courts need not defer to the views of other branches.
This article discusses not so much how treaties are interpreted as who
interprets them. Just as words can have different meanings when their
linguistic context changes, 10 they can have different meanings when their
interpretive context changes, geographically or institutionally. Part II explains why treaties, even more so than other documents, need not be read
identically in all circumstances. 1" Part III discusses the implication of that
inconstancy for traditional doctrines of judicial deference to other
branches' interpretations of treaties.12 Part IV considers the level of respect that U.S. courts should accord to treaty interpretation decisions of
the International Court of Justice. 13 Part V concludes that courts in the
United States can fulfill their domestic duty while contributing to global
legal order if they defer less to the executive branch and, while not ceding
their constitutional authority over the internal application of treaties, treat
the judgments of the International Court of Justice with something more
14
than indifference.

10. As Judge Calabresi memorably noted, "Language does not have a 'plain
meaning' outside of its particular context. 'You should have passed, dummy,'
means something entirely different at a bridge table from what it means on
Superbowl Sunday. The same words signify very different things because the linguistic context has changed." Peterson Marital Trust v. Comm'r, 78 F.3d 795, 796
(2d Cir. 1996).
11. For a discussion of treaties' inherent inconstancy, see infra notes 15-45
and accompanying text.

12. For a discussion of treaty interpretation, see infra notes 46-177 and accompanying text.

13. For a discussion of U.S. courts and the International Court of Justice, see
infra notes 178-328 and accompanying text.

14. For a discussion of that view, see infra notes 329-36 and accompanying
text.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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THE INHERENT INCONSTANCY OF TREATIES

When interpreting treaties, we must never forget what we are expounding. 15 But we must also bear in mind who "we" are. The perspective
of the interpreter inevitably influences the reading of a text. 16 For treaties, more than other documents, that reality is not problematic: they can
legitimately be interpreted differently depending on the identity of the
interpreter. 17 In other words, they have no fixed "correct" meaning.
That claim of polyvalence may sound anomalous. Surely the answer
to a legal question about what a provision in an agreement means cannot
change with the forum. 18 There may be descriptions of why answers dif-

fer, but normatively, one might say that conflicting results mean that one
interpreter has erred. 19 Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that "any
15. Justice Marshall famously cautioned that when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding."
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). I have argued elsewhere that

treaties also warrant special interpretive attention to distinguish them from statutes
and contracts. See Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty
We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 35-39,
on file with author) (describing differences between treaties, contracts, and statutes in form and function).
16. Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel have acknowledged the difficulty of
approaching problems objectively but have encouraged people to try to suppress
their individual perspectives and make decisions that take into account the reality
that no single one of us is the center of the universe. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NOWHERE 4, 60-66, 176 (1986) (describing way of looking at world and
explaining objectivity). That approach may be desirable for personal moral dilemmas. But a treaty reader's view is not from Nagel's utopian "Nowhere"-it is from
the reader's nation and from the reader's particular function (such as judicial or
executive) within that nation. To fulfill the interpreter's role, that particular perspective should be embraced, not suppressed.
17. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L.
REv. 1479, 1554 (1987) (arguing that statutes "have different meanings to different
people").
18. The forum for interpretation of a treaty may be not only "a national
court.... an [inter]national court, or... a university classroom," Richard Stith &
J.H.H. Weiler, An Epistolary Exchange: Can Treaty Law Be Supreme, Directly Effective,
and Autonomous-All at the Same Time?, 34 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 729, 729 (2002),
but also a national executive or legislative body.
19. The premise of a short story of legal science fiction entitled Non Sub
Homine is that a computer programmed with all legal precedent has been granted
full authority to make decisions binding on the populace, to "tak[e] law out of the
hands of man." H.W. Whyte, Non Sub Homine, in DARK SINS, DARK DREAMS 121, 123
(Barry N. Malzberg & Bill Pronzoni eds., 1978). On reading legal questions that
were typed in, the computer offers definitive answers. But one day, the computer
does double duty and prints out two conflicting opinions interpreting an ambiguous contract, baffling its creators. Id. at 124-25. Which is more fictional-the
premise that a computer could usurp the function of judges and resolve legal disputes, or the notion that such a computer could never reach two different conclusions in the same case because in a government sub lege rather than sub homine, only
one result could be legitimate? Surely the computer is realistic in resisting the idea
that precedent and interpretive canons could produce but one outcome. Although the solution of the computers' creators in the story is to choose randomly
between the decisions, id. at 125, in real life the choice of which of multiple legiti-
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document purporting to be serious and to have some legal effect has one
meaning and no other ....
-20 1 posit, though, that while treaties are
"serious," they can be read in different ways without any of the interpreters' being wrong.
It is not hard to construct an example of an agreement whose interpretation should differ from one interpreter to another. Suppose parties
from two jurisdictions agree as follows: "A promises to give x to B in exchange for y; if a dispute arises, the parties intend that the substantive rule
of the forum court be used to interpret x and y." A court in A's jurisdiction giving effect to the parties' intentions would apply ruleA, whereas a
court in B's jurisdiction would apply ruleB. Thus, the interpretive result
could well differ by forum without an error by either court. In one sense,
the agreement has a single meaning, but with the important gloss that the
outcome of a dispute may well depend on its location.
In that example, the choice-of-law clause was explicit. Even when an
agreement is silent on that topic, though, the content of that clause may
be understood and accepted by the parties; if so, then to give effect to the
parties' intentions, the agreement should be construed as if the clause
were explicit. Treaty partners generally do not include clauses such as the
following: "The parties intend that no matter what tribunal interprets this
agreement, the rules of interpretation set forth in articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties shall apply." The absence of
such provisions suggests that the parties accept, and most likely even intend, that rules of interpretation will vary by court. 2 1 Therefore, multiple
interpreters can reach disparate results without any error.
Much of the above explanation could apply to private domestic contracts as well as to treaties. 22 But it has particular relevance to treaties
because the crucial factual assumption is more likely to be true. Differences in treaty interpretation rules between tribunals such as the International Court of Justice and U.S. courts are more pronounced than
differences in interpretive rules for contracts among the various U.S.jurisdictions. 23 Accordingly, treaty negotiators are more likely than domestic
mate decisions to make is not random but rather slanted in terms of who is issuing
the decision.
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 HARv. L. Rxv.
417, 417 (1899) (comparing legal meaning in theory with that in practice when
word does not just have one meaning); see also CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
613 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) ("It is essential for the words of the laws to awaken the
same ideas in all men.").
21. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CoTrRACTS § 201(2) (1981) (binding contracting parties to each other's interpretations that they knew of or had reason to
know of at time of contracting).
22. But cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (implicitly assuming that
while contracting parties expect procedural rules to vary by forum, substantive law
governing should remain constant).
23. The International Court of Justice usually follows the textualist approach
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, regardless of whether that conMONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws
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contracting parties to be aware of the distinction; silence in the agreement
as to which interpretive rules control is thus more likely to evince an intent
to have one set of rules apply in one forum and a different set in another.
Moreover, as sophisticated representatives of sovereigns, the parties negotiating treaties are more likely to contemplate the significance of interpretive jurisprudence than drafters of domestic contracts. In short, for
treaties, silence is less likely to reflect mere lack of thought about what
24
interpretive rules should govern.
A further basis for treaties' especial susceptibility to diverse interpretations is their diplomatic nature. 25 In that vein, parties could intend that in
any dispute arising from a certain treaty provision in a domestic court, that
court should act in its country's own national interest and avoid interpretations that would dramatically shift the status quo. Thus, results could
legitimately differ from one court to the next. For example, suppose that
in nation A, aliens' access to civil courts is limited, and in nation B, aliens
have no such access whatsoever. In a treaty, the nations agree that the

citizens of each shall have "freedom of access" to the other's courts. 2 6 A
court in A might interpret the treaty to give aliens from B equal access,
whereas a court in B might read it as allowing aliens from A some limited

access. 2 7 Those results would reflect the different baselines of the parties'
domestic legal systems. Although the treaty provision appeared to be revention specifically applies in the case at hand; U.S. courts tend to stray from the
text more often. For a discussion of U.S. courts' approach to treaty interpretation,
see infra Section IV.A.
24. The "silence equals consent" view can be abused. For example, in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), one way the Supreme Courtjustified
its holding that kidnapping did not violate an extradition treaty was by stating that
Mexico was on notice at the time of the treaty of the Court's Ker doctrine, under
which abduction is acceptable. Id. at 665 & n.11.. Even.,if Mexico's negotiators
were aware of that doctrine, it seems unlikely that they would have intended as
part of the extradition treaty that the United States could circumvent the treaty by
abduction. In contrast, it is not implausible that parties could, through their silence as to interpretive rules, acquiesce or even affirmatively intend to have different rules apply in different fora, because that condition would not lead as
inexorably to a shocking substantive result.
25. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902). Tucker summed up
treaty diplomacy as follows:
As treaties are solemn engagements entered into between independent
nations for the common advancement of their interests and the interests
of civilization, and as their main object is not only to avoid war... but to
promote a friendly feeling between the people of the two countries, they
should be interpreted in that broad and liberal spirit which is calculated
to make for the existence of a perpetual amity ....
Id.
26. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug.
15, 1955, U.S.-Iran, art. III, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 899, 902-03 (allowing "freedom of
access to the [other party's] courts ofjustice... upon terms no less favorable than
those applicable to nationals ... of [the other party] or of any third country").
27. See Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir.
2003) (interpreting similar treaty as granting less than national treatment).
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ciprocal, the parties might well have understood that in light of the different domestic backgrounds, the end results need not be identical.
Along the same lines, some treaty provisions are drafted as much for
political purposes as for legal effect. 28 And certain provisions may be legally effective only on an international plane, without being enforceable in
29
domestic courts; such provisions are referred to as "non-self-executing."
As a result, domestic courts in treaty partners' countries may render what
appear to be conflicting decisions without being wrong. For example, suppose that in two countries, the background law is that citizens have more
leeway than aliens to choose the venue of a domestic suit, but a treaty
provides that citizens of each country shall receive national treatment in
the other's courts. 30 In a suit by a citizen of C against a citizen of D in
nation C, the court may interpret the treaty and conclude that the plaintiff's choice of forum controls, whereas for the same suit in nation D, the
court may read the treaty and hold that the defendant's choice governs. It
might appear that one court must be wrong, but the treaty partners may
have intended that the national treatment provision be non-self-executing
and thereby unenforceable in domestic courts. Thus, the outcomes in
identical suits would, pursuant to the intentions of the parties, vary by
court.
This notion of variable treaty interpretation may run counter to Ronald Dworkin's well-known insight that rarely, if at all, is there a hard case
28. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLTIcs AMONG NATIONS 269 (4th ed. 1967)
(noting that treaties are often purposely vague so that parties can shape text to fit
their national interests); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES
1945-1986, at 59 (Sir Robert Y. Jennings ed., 1989) (noting that text of treaties is
often deliberately ambiguous); see also Charles Cheney Hyde, The Interpretation of
Treaties by the Supreme Court of the United States, 23 AM.J. INT'L L. 824, 826 n.5 (1929)
(noting that treaties often omit "the full scope of sacrifices" country intends to
make). Alexander Hamilton often stressed the role of "good faith" in treaties.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting that treaties "depend[ ] for [their] execution on the good faith of
the parties"); THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (making same point); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that treaties "have the force
of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith").
29. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (declining to give effect to
treaty because "the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court"); see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 198-204 (2d ed. 1996) (describing distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). Even if a provision is self-executing, it may
not grant individuals a private right of action. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] ("Whether a treaty is self-executing
is a question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights or remedies.");
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695, 719-22 (1995) (differentiating non-self-executing treaties from treaties that
do not confer private rights of action).
30. For a discussion of treaty language citing this effect, see supranote 26 and
accompanying text.
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with no right answer.3 1 I posit that treaty interpretation cases often have
no right answer-or more precisely, that they have more than one legitimate answer. Professor Dworkin conceives of the possibility that a case
might not have a right answer if it is posed as a choice between two alternatives when in fact there is a third possible outcome, or when the answer
is on the borderline of the two choices.3 2 Still, he argues that such cases
hardly ever occur because, empirically, lawyers treat "not liable" as the3 3negation of "liable," with no middle ground between the two concepts.

In my view, treaty disputes regularly present such cases. Treaties are
often designed in part to cement diplomatic ties, not only to create rights
and obligations between the parties.3 4 When nations enter into a treaty,
they know that although it is a legal document, it is not subject to the same
enforcement mechanisms as other legal documents; compliance is often a
matter of politics. 35 Treaties are thus inherently less susceptible to legalistic categorization than other documents. There is conceptual space between the following two ideas: "the treaty provision is law and requires x to
do y" and "the treaty provision is not law and x has no need whatsoever to
do y." 36 That space leaves leeway for interpreters; within a circumscribed
31. See RONALD DwoRUuN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119, 144 (1985) (arguing
that "no-right-answer cases" are real).
32. See id. at 120-21. For example, in a case putatively about whether or not a

contract exists, the correct result might be that only an "inchoate" contract exists.
Id. at 121.
33. See id. at 123, 126 (arguing that lawyers tend not to see gray area between
"not valid" and "valid," "not liable" and "liable," and "is not a crime" and "is a
crime").
34. For a case citing this effect of treaties, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
35. See Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 37 (Dec. 2)

(acknowledging that enforcement of International Court decisions is political matter). The common perception that treaties are legitimate legal documents tends

to have the practical effect of inducing compliance, even if traditional enforcement mechanisms are absent. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM.J. INT'L L. 705, 705-06, 758 (1988) (noting that nations' compliance
with international law is voluntary and unenforced).
36. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 19 (2d ed. 1979) (noting common view among diplomats that principles observed by nations on international
plane do not constitute "law"); RoSENNE, supra note 28, at 60 ("[T]he exact language of the treaty provision in question must always be carefully scrutinized and
analysed before the conclusion is reached that the provision is truly mandatory
and not merely exhortatory or optative."); Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of
NonbindingInternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 297-98 (1977) (noting
"calculated ambiguity about the obligatory force" of many agreements).
The Supreme Court has carved out a similar wedge of conceptual space in a
different context. When the Court instructs another federal court on a remand, it
mandates further proceedings "consistent" with its opinion. See, e.g., Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 (2004) (addressing federal district court). When it
sends a case back to a state court, however, the request is a more oblique one for
proceedings "not inconsistent" with its opinion. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (addressing state court). That linguistic variation
reflects the lesser degree of supervisory power the Court exerts over state courts.
There is room between "consistent" and "inconsistent" for the murky status of "not
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37
range of possible results, no single result may be mandated.
Moreover, even if an interpreter had no discretion and could reach
but a single correct answer, that answer might well change with the interpretive circumstances. Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle" explains that
it is impossible to know the exact position and velocity of an object at the
same time, as measuring an object's position alters its velocity. 38 Likewise,
an interpreter interacts with a document, making the ideal of a single,

39
static interpretation unrealistic-particularly for treaties.

The European Court of Human Rights has developed a doctrine that
reflects this protean nature of treaties: "margin of appreciation." The doctrine began as a safety valve to allow nations to ignore their obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights during times of public
emergency. 40 It has now acquired somewhat broader currency and allows
inconsistent." Likewise, there is room between "binding" and "non-binding" for a
condition one might call "not non-binding." Certain treaty provisions are "not
non-binding": not exactly binding in the traditional sense of being subject to effective enforcement measures, but not non-binding either, because they are treated
by parties as creating legal obligations. Professor Dworkin generally refuses to acknowledge that type of conceptual space. See DwouUN, supra note 31, at 133
(equating "[1]awmakers have commanded that the contract not be enforced" and
"[I] awmakers have not commanded that the contract be enforced") (quoting Sec'y
of State for Educ. & Sci. v. Tameside Metro. Borough Council, [1976] 3 W.L.R.
641). But if such hair-splitting is appropriate in the context of federal-state relations, it is for international agreements as well.
37. SeeJ.L. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 325 (6th ed. 1963) ("[D]iplomatic
documents, including treaties, do not as a rule invite the very strict methods of
interpretation that an English court applies, for example, to an Act of Parliament."); Oliver Morse, Schools of Approach to the Interpretationof Treaties, 9 CATH. U.
L. REv. 36, 37 (1960) (observing that out of "moderation and courtesy .... the
[treaty] language used is not completely indicative of [the parties'] desires and demands, i.e. intentions"). As H.L.A. Hart recognized, "in any legal system there will
always be certain .. .cases in which on some point no decision either way is dictated." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 272 (2d ed. 1994) (contrasting this
view with Professor Dworkin's position that judge can resort to implicit principles
to reach correct result).
38. See, e.g.,
E. Buks et al., Dephasing in Electron Interference by a "Which-Path"
Detector, 391 NATURE 871, 871-72 (1998) (reporting results of physics experiment
as showing that "simultaneous observations of wave and particle behavior [are]
prohibited").
39. Scientists know that although multiple observations of the same phenomenon theoretically should be identical, they are not, because observers are human;
the "method of least squares" has emerged as one way to assess the mostly likely
correct answer among varying measurements. See STEPHEN M. STIGLER, THE HISTORY OF STATISTICS 146 (1986) (claiming that least squares method provides most
accurate estimates). Varying measurements happen in the law too, of coursedifferent interpreters can read the same document and reach different results.
That may be an unfortunate truth for documents such as contracts or statutes.
Due to treaties' diplomatic nature, though, it is less of a problem when they are
inevitably read differently by different entities.
40. See HowARD CHARLES YOUROW,THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 14-15 (1996) (noting
traces of martial law in origins of doctrine). Specifically, the doctrine stems from
the provision in the European Convention on Human Rights that "[i] n time of war
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nations reasonable deviation in their domestic implementation of human
fights norms from multilateral treaties. 4 1 As one observer has noted,
"[w]hat is most striking about the margin of appreciation is that it expressly contemplates that international treaty obligations originating from
a unitary text may be interpreted in different ways in different states. "42
Still, to date, the doctrine's application largely has been limited to the
Human Rights Convention. Though the idea of a "margin of appreciation" has been criticized for its arbitrariness, 43 it makes sense for other
treaties as well. Whether under that label or not, interpreters should acknowledge that a treaty's meaning may vary with its context.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently offered a surprisingly explicit admission that the timing of an interpretation of the Constitution can affect
the result. Specifically, it predicted that the correct resolution of an equal
44
protection issue today would likely be incorrect in twenty-five years.
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. One of the article's
first uses came after Ireland detained an individual without charging or trying him,
in potential violation of Article 5 of the convention. See generally Lawless v. Ireland,
1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1961) (determining whether suspect's detention violates
Article 5). The European Commission of Human Rights held that because Ireland
was at that time in a state of emergency and because the detention was necessary,
Ireland had not violated its obligation under the convention. See id. at 408 (noting
that national security measures under declared national emergency permitted suspect's detention without violating Article 5).
41. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication,107 YALE LJ.273, 316-17 (1997) (explaining how "margin of appreciation" doctrine demonstrates acknowledgment by European Court
of Human Rights of governments' discretion when applying or interpreting treaties). The doctrine has been applied flexibly, depending on factors such as the
type of right being asserted. Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of
Women's Human Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 173 (1994) ("The breadth of a
state's margin of appreciation is inversely proportional to the universality of the
human right."); see, e.g., Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 17383/90, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 33, 67 (1997) (noting that extent of margin of appreciation "var[ies] in the
light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake").
42. Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Casefor a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARv.J. INT'L L. 357, 404
(1998) (commenting on margin of appreciation as tool by which states are given
"breathing room" to balance protection of liberties against other societal
concerns).
43. See Larry Catd Backer, InscribingJudicial Preferences into Our Fundamental
Law: On the EuropeanPrincipleof Margins of Appreciation as ConstitutionalJurisprudence
in the U.S., 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 327, 350-51 (2000) (summarizing
criticism).

44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309-10 (2003); cf WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58 (1994) ("The interpreter's un-

derstanding is ... a historically situated event."); Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1554
(arguing that statutes "have different meanings ... at different times"). In upholding the pro-diversity admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School,
the Court found the policy "necessary" to further the state government's "compelling" interest in the educational benefits of student body diversity. Grutter, 539
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Surely if chronological time can properly influence interpretation, 45 so
can institutional place. As delicate instruments that mix foreign policy
and legal obligation, treaties are particularly susceptible to interpretations
that vary with the role of the interpreter. The President, a U.S. court, a
domestic court of a treaty partner, the International Court of Justiceeven on the same day, all can be metaphorically more than a quarter-century apart in their perspectives on treaties.
III.

INTERBRANCH INTERPRETATIONS OF TREATIES

As Guido Calabresi elegantly illustrated in a situation that brought his
roles as academic and government official to a head, even the same person
can legitimately reach different opinions when wearing different institutional hats. Dissenting in a product liability case ,46 Judge Calabresi backed
the risk-utility test as the measure of design defects. 47 In a footnote, however, he mentioned that ProfessorCalabresi had written a law review article
favoring the consumer expectations test used by the majority. As he explained, "my personal preferences are, of course, irrelevant to the task
before us."

48

Because he was deciding a diversity case, what mattered to judge Cala49
bresi was which test the New York Court of Appeals would likely use.
This shunting aside of personal preferences happens every day when
judges decide cases. It is not particularly surprising that one's formal role
helps shape the outcome of one's decision. It is also no surprise that actors in different branches of government might interpret the same treaty
differently. That does not mean that some of the interpretations are
wrong, any more than Judge Calabresi had to be wrong if Professor Calabresi was right. Thus, in a system of parallel branches, doctrines of deference are unwarranted.
U.S. at 328-29 (stating holding of case). That necessity is temporary, though:
"The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Id. at 310.
45. Time can legitimately affect a decision not only because surrounding factual circumstances change, but also because people's view of the historical background underlying legal documents such as treaties is unavoidably influenced by
the present. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF
HISTORY FOR LIFE 34 (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1874) (criticizing historians who pride themselves on their "objectivity" when they "measur[e]
past opinions and deeds by the common opinions of the moment").
46. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal
of plaintiffs' claim that manufacturer of bullets used to shoot them was strictly
liable for injuries).
47. See id. at 172-73 (CalabresiJ., dissenting) (explaining belief that majority
erred in applying consumer expectations test in dismissing plaintiffs claim).
48. Id. at 172 n.30 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 172-73 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (declaring that New York Court
of Appeals would likely apply risk-utility test to determine defectiveness of
product).
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Due Difference

The Supreme Court has boldly proclaimed its "duty . . . to enforce
50
It has not,
the... treaties of the United States, whatever they might be."
unfortunately, added a vow to enforce treaties "whatever the executive
branch's interpretation might be." Instead, it has historically deferred
mightily to the interpretations of the executive branch, perhaps because
51
As David Bederman has
that branch handles the actual enforcement.
put it, "U]udicial deference to the Executive's position is the single best
52
A close
predictor of interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases."
cousin of deference is the "political question" doctrine. Courts often invoke that doctrine to avoid reviewing executive branch activity in cases
involving foreign policy. 53 The Supreme Court has explicitly denied itself
power in such cases: "[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to for54
eign policy is political, not judicial."
The extent of judicial deference is so extreme that some courts have
deferred to the executive branch even when the third branch-the legislature-disagrees. For example, in Kucinich v. Bush,5 5 thirty-two representafives challenged President Bush's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic

50. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985) (quoting Reed v. Wiser, 555
F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977)).
51. E.g., El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168-69 (1999) ("Respect
is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the
meaning of an international treaty."); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369
(1989) (opining that executive views are "entitled to great weight") (quoting
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)); see also
United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1979)) ("[T]he ultimate decision as to how the United States should honor its treaty obligations with the international community is one which has . . .been left to the executive to decide.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 326(2) (1987) (noting "great weight" given by courts to executive interpretations).
52. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,41 UCLA L.
REv. 953, 1015 (1994) (indicating that in all but one of ten cases considered by
Rehnquist Court, holdings followed express wishes of executive branch). When
individual rights are concerned, courts are a bit more probing of executive policy
than otherwise, but even so, they tend to defer. See HENKIN, supra note 29, at 136
(listing series of cases in which court reviewed executive decisions relating to civil
liberties).
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 1988) (ordering
dismissal of case in which plaintiff sought to require President to take action to
obtain release of American prisoners of war); Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc.
v. Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming
dismissal of dispute about sovereignty because case fell in exclusive domain of executive branch); c.f Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962) (discussing discretionary applicability of political question doctrine in context of foreign policy).
But see HENKIN, supra note 29, at 141-42 (questioning whether Supreme Court has
approved of political question doctrine in foreign affairs cases).
54. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(explaining proposition that decisions of foreign policy are "wholly confided" by
Constitution to political departments of government, not to courts).
55. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).
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Missile Treaty without receiving approval from Congress. 56 One of the
district court's alternative grounds for dismissing the suit was nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine. 57 Whatever the label, unwarranted deference amounts to nothing short of abdication of thejudiciary's
58
responsibility in our constitutional system.
1.

Separation of Powers

Courts often preface their genuflection to the executive branch with
comments about the uniqueness of treaties. 59 That uniqueness does properly affect how treaties should be interpreted. 60

It should not, however,

change who interprets them. 6 1 The mere fact that treaties are instruments
of diplomacy does not change their status as "Law of the Land." 6 2 To be
sure, some treaty provisions may be more politically affective than legally
effective.

But sorting out what treaties mean is a role for courts. Under

our constitutional separation of powers, the judiciary is an equal branch,
not subservient to the executive, and is charged with deciding cases "arising under.. . Treaties." 6 3 In doing so, federal courts should affirmatively
interpret treaties rather than deferring to the will of the executive.
a.

One Voice
The Supreme Court's justification for judicial deference in matters of

foreign policy is that international issues "uniquely demand single-voiced
56. See id. at 2.
57. See id. at 18.
58. The Supreme Court has on occasion spoken up for the nondelegable role
of courts. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986) (emphasizing that while certain foreign policy issues are properly left to
executive branch, Court should not "shirk" its responsibility to interpret statutes
simply because case has "political overtones").
59. See Bederman, supra note 52, at 964 (explaining that courts may use distinctiveness of treaties as easy excuse for deference).
60. See Alex Glashausser, supra note 15 (manuscript at 61-75) (describing
how and why treaties should be interpreted differently from statutes and private
contracts).
61. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation,44 VA.J. INT'L L. 431, 479-80 (2004) (arguing that federal courts play
important role in interpreting treaties just as they do in interpreting statutes, despite political implications possible in each context). The International Court of
Justice has found the interpretation of treaties to be "an essentially judicial task"
and on occasion has stood up to that task in the face of weighty political issues.
Certain Expenses of United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151,155 (July 20) (rejecting argument that Court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in cases with political significance). But seeJohn Dugard, The Nuclear Tests Cases and the South West Africa Cases:
Some Realism About the InternationalJudicial Decision, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 465
(1976) (addressing instances when Court has shrunk from task of treaty
interpretation).
62. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
63. See id. at art. 1II, § 2 (establishing extent of judicial power). The statute
conferring federal question jurisdiction likewise comprises civil actions "arising
under .. . treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
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statement of the Government's views." 64 Along those lines, Justice
necessary on judicial
O'Connor has written an essay about the limitations 65
review to preserve the "unity" of U.S. foreign policy.
Scholars have also touted the benefits of monolithic treaty interpretation. For example, John Yoo has argued that because the treaty power is
fundamentally executive-given its placement in Article II of the Constitution-the President should have the last say, or even the only say, in interpreting treaties. 66 In his view, the President should be able to interpret,
reinterpret, and violate treaties as he sees fit, deciding when it would be
appropriate to incur the international political costs of violations. 67 Professor Yoo acknowledges that interpretations of a certain treaty might
evolve over time, but stresses that the interpreter does not: it is the President.6 8 He finds the notion that a treaty might have one meaning interna-

tionally, as interpreted by the President, and another meaning
domestically, as interpreted by courts, to be "bizarre."69 That notion, he
says, makes little sense constitutionally and "makes for unacceptable for70
eign policy."
64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Yet it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.").
65. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAw
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS

13, 14 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds.,

1996) (explaining -that power of judicial review is limited by political branches'
autonomy with respect to foreign relations).
66. SeeJohn Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation
of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation,89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 869, 882-83 (2001) [hereinafter Yoo, ABM Treaty] (arguing that constitutional text and policy compel that
result); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretationand the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1305, 1315 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaty Interpretation] (arguing that structure and text of Constitution support strong executive role).
67. See Yoo, ABM Treaty, supra note 66, at 874-77 (arguing that it is within
President's executive power to interpret, abrogate, and violate treaties, if necessary, just as it is in President's power to conduct day-to-day task of managing international relations).
68. See id. at 881 (comparing courts' continued interpretation of evolving statutes with President's ongoing interpretation of evolving treaties).
69. See id. at 862 (noting that if treaties can have two meanings, then they
could impose differing legal obligations in different settings).

70. See id.; see also PAUL

REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES

74

(Jos6 Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1989) ("The fact that different entities
are called upon to interpret the treaty does not in principle affect the manner in
which interpretation must be performed."); ROSENNE, supra note 28, at 124 (calling inconsistent domestic interpretations in different countries "[a] problem");
Kenneth S. Gallant, American Treaties, InternationalLaw: Treaty InterpretationAfter the
Biden Condition, 21 Amz. ST. L.J. 1067, 1072-74 & n.24 (1989) (arguing that treaty
provisions should receive same interpretation domestically and internationally);
Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 33 VA.J. INT'L L. 51, 53 (1992)
("[A] treaty cannot have different meanings domestically and internationally .... "); John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution and the Rule of
Law, 42 VA.J. INT'L L. 163, 175 (2001) (arguing that standards of treaty interpretation must be "unitary," rather than allowing Senate's unilateral understandings to
control over internationally accepted legal standards). But see RESTATEMENT
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This chorus calling for the federal government to speak with one
voice has deep roots. James Madison wrote that "[ilf we are to be one
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."7 1
Building a reputation of the United States as a trustworthy treaty partner
was seen as important to protect the safety of the nation. 72 Alexander
Hamilton worried that the weak existing confederation stopped the country from entering treaties and that no nation in the future would have any
reason to enter any pacts with the United States if it continued to be unable to control its members. 7 3 Indeed, one of the prominent perceived
benefits of a strong federal government, as opposed to the loose arrangement of states under the Articles of Confederation, was that treaties would
have one fixed meaning. As John Jay explained, under the Constitution,
"treaties ... will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the
same manner-whereas adjudications on the same points and questions,
in thirteen States ....

be consistent."

74

[absent the Constitution] will not always accord or

(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,

supra note 29, § 326 cmt. b (1987) (suggesting

that President and courts may adopt different interpretations of treaties); Abraham D. Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation:A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1437, 1440

(1989) (arguing that because pre-ratification Senate understandings can bind
President under domestic law, treaties can have different meanings on national
and international planes).

71. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining why federal government, rather than states, should have power
to make treaties and regulate international relations); cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 148 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980)
(1690) (warning of "disorder and ruin" that could accompany inconsistent application of "executive" and "federative" powers).
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting that treaty breach was just cause of war); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that court judgments,
including those involving treaties, can be just cause of war).
73. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that lack of uniform power to regulate commerce under
confederation forced many countries to avoid entering into treaties with states).
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961'); see
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 151 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(bemoaning fact that under Confederation, treaties were subject to final judgments of thirteen different courts and noting that foreign nations could not "respect or confide in such a government"). Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South
Carolina at the Constitutional Convention, warned that the Constitution had to
assure potential treaty partners of the new union's trustworthiness: "Shall we not
be stigmatized as a faithless, unworthy people, if each member of the Union may,
with impunity, violate the engagements entered into by the federal government?
Who will confide in us?" 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 278 (1937). As David Golove has
written, "conflicts over the treaty power and states' rights were recurrent under the
Confederation," and by the time of the Constitution, the Framers had learned that
"the federal government had to have sufficient power to ensure that any obligations it undertook to foreign countries would be observed by the states...." David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1103-04 (2000).
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Jay had particular experience with the problem of having states undermine treaties. In a 1786 report to Congress about British charges that
individual states were violating the provision in the Treaty of Peace assuring that British creditors would face no "lawful impediment" to collecting
"bona fide debts," Jay complained that several states had enacted laws that
impeded such collection efforts. Individual states could not be free to
wreak such havoc on the nation's foreign policy, in Jay's view, or else "the
same article of the same treaty may by law mean one thing in New Hampshire, another in New York, and neither the one nor the other in
75
Georgia."
As a result of those concerns, the Constitution vested the treaty power
in the federal government and specifically barred states from entering
treaties. 76 Moreover, the Supremacy Clause and the Foreign Affairs
Clauses helped ensure that despite the nation's federal nature, it could, to
a great extent, act uniformly with respect to treaties. 77 Indeed, when it
AcTs

AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS, FROM
75. See 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE
THE FIRST MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE

ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

205, 213-15, 233-39

(1821), quoted in Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 256-57 (2000). The
debt collection issue reached the Supreme Court in 1796. See Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244-45 (1796) (upholding treaty over conflicting Virginia
statute).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (denying states power to enter into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that many states are likely to interpret treaties
in varying manners).
77. According to Louis Henkin, when it comes to foreign relations, "the states
'do not exist.'" HENKIN, supranote 29, at 150 (discussing limited state role in facilitating foreign relations) (quoting United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937)). The current position of the federal government, however, is that it cannot force states to comply with the nation's treaty obligations. See Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (stating that normally procedural rules of forum
state govern implementation of treaties within that state). In one of the Consular
Convention cases in which the International Court ofJustice had provisionally ordered the United States to stay the execution of a prisoner, the Solicitor General
argued that in some circumstances, the only way the federal government can influence state court systems is "persuasion." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 46, 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214).
In that case, the method of persuasion was a request by the Secretary of State to
the Governor of Virginia to stay the execution. Id. For a discussion of a 1906 clash
between the federal government and the city of San Francisco over a treaty with
Japan, see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
In addition, it is fairly common for the United States to include reservations in
multilateral conventions that stress the incomplete ability of the federal government to control states, such as the one in the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, para. 1, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
h_cat39.htm:
The United States shall implement the Convention to the extent that the
Federal Government exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein; to the extent that constituent units exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take appropriate measures, to the end that the competent authorities of the
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comes to treaties, instead of its frequent posture of constraining the federal government from overreaching vis-,A-vis the states, the Supreme Court
has focused more on preventing states from disrupting the federal government's foreign policy. 78 That approach, enshrined in the Constitution,
because, in one sense at least,
makes the country's foreign relations easier
79
the nation can speak with a single voice.
b.

Cords and Branches

The benefits of speaking with a single voice notwithstanding, there is
no escaping the constitutional reality that the voice of the federal government has several cords: the three branches. Foreign relations might run
more smoothly if the federal executive branch could not only control unruly states but also bar the federal judiciary from potentially disruptive domestic interpretations of treaties. Within the federal government, though,
there is no parallel to the Supremacy Clause. The executive branch may
have the exclusive power to make treaties, but under the constitutional
separation of powers, it has no basis for stifling courts' application of such
treaties in domestic litigation. 80 Instead, by invoking a rule of deference
constituent units may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of
this Convention.

REc. 17,486 (1990).
In contrast, a recent unsigned note argues that the federal government need
not be reduced to mere exhortation in its efforts to have states obey the obliga136

CONG.

tions it has taken on. See Note, Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States
Beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations?, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2654, 2671-73 (2003).

Rather, the author suggests several ways for the federal government to flex its
power: (1) stays of execution by federal courts against state court judgments; (2)
suits in federal court for injunctive relief against states; and (3) suits by foreign
nations against states in federal court. Id. Although the last alternative would require a reevaluation of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, the first two options may
be feasible ways to rein in the states. But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390, 394 (1998) (questioning "nationalist
view" of federal government's almost unlimited treaty power).
78. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)
(refusing to allow states to adopt interpretations of international law different
from that of federal government); Ware, 3 U.S. at 243-45 (upholding treaty allowing British creditors to collect debts despite Virginia statute purporting to discharge such obligations).
79. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."). In holding unconstitutional a California statute that gave victims a cause
of action against German and Japanese corporations that engaged in slave labor
during World War II, the Ninth Circuit recently listed the various clauses in articles
I and 11 (including the Treaty Clause) that allocate the power to determine foreign
policy to the federal government and bar states from engaging in their own foreign policy. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that despite lack of constitutional text so specifying, states do not have
power to conduct their own foreign policies).
80. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The JudicialPower and Treaty Delegation,90 CAL.
L. REv. 1263, 1271, 1276-77 (2002) (stressing that power to create law is separate
from power to interpret it).
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and creating the political question doctrine, courts have improperly stifled
themselves.
Judicial review of executive interpretations of treaties may well disrupt
the unity many have clamored for. While the benefit of unity-or the
downside of dissent-may be particularly strong in the area of foreign relations, unblinking solidarity undermines the essence of our system of
checks and balances. Expressing an opinion does not tread on the executive's power; indeed, no judicial opinion can be enforced without the assent of the executive branch.8 1 To say that a court should decline to
interpret documents drafted by other branches because such review might
disrupt unity is to say that the judicial branch should not be independent.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, to maintain the separation
of powers that is "essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that
each department should have a will of its own." 82 The judiciary has its

own will and need not subvert it to that of the executive just because the
matter involves a treaty.
Some have tried to discourage the judiciary from fulfilling its constitutional function by appealing to extralegal duties. For example, Justice Iredell once pressured courts not to disrupt the country's foreign affairs:
[A] treaty ...

is valid and obligatory, in point of moral obligation,

on all, as well on the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Departments, (so far as the authority of either extends, which in regard
to the last, must, in this respect, be very limited) ... because it is
a promise in effect by the whole nation to another nation, and if
not in fact complied with, unless there be valid reasons for non83
compliance, the public faith is violated.
Whatever "moral obligation" courts may have to ensure that the nation
keeps its international promises, however, is irrelevant to whether courts
must agree with the executive branch about the substance of those
promises. Federal courts' primary obligation, whether one labels it legal
or moral, is to render opinions in the cases before them, not to abnegate
84
that role in the name of unity.

81. Much has been written about the purported supremacy of the judicial
branch since Marbury v. Madison. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfactionwith the Administration ofJustice, 29 REP. OF A.B.A. 395, 406-07 (1906)

(detailing "political jealousy of the courts" caused byjudiciary's claim to supremacy
of law). But mere comments on the legality of the actions of other braches of
government hardly threaten to usurp constitutional power.
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (advocating separate and distinct exercise of different powers of
government).
83. Ware, 3 U.S. at 272 (Iredell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added) (explaining supremacy of treaties over state law).
84. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10
(1801) (noting federal courts' "obligation" to apply treaties as supreme law of
land); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing Supreme Court's "duty 'to say what the law is'") (quoting United
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss1/2
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Independent judicial review of executive treaty interpretations is important for reasons beyond the theoretical separation-of-powers implications. As a practical matter, courts must prevent the President from
misusing the treaty power for domestic purposes. Self-executing treaties
85
Thus, a
operate as domestic law without any implementing legislation.
President who cannot convince Congress to enact a bill has the opportunity to effect the same result through a treaty. The treaty must be ratified
by two-thirds of the Senators present, but the House of Representatives
plays no role. 86 It would likely be unconstitutional for a President to conclude a treaty with the goal of advancing domestic policy. 87 If courts defer
to the President's view of what the treaty means, however, such an end run
around the constitutional process for enacting federal legislation would be
unchecked.
Moreover, even if Congress is politically amenable to enacting a domestic bill, the law might be struck by courts as falling outside the legislature's enumerated powers. If the President circumvents that problem by
concluding a self-executing treaty to the same effect, the treaty might be
constitutional under Missouri v. Holland.88 But the constitutionally permissible scope of treaties is not unlimited: they must stay within the bounds of
"proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations." 89 If courts defer to executive branch readings of treaties, that limitation will be no restriction whatsoever, because the President will be the
only one to decide whether the subject of the treaty was proper.
Even when there is no concern that the President might have used a
particular treaty to substitute for a statute, courts still have good reason to
interpret the treaty. After all, domestically, a self-executing treaty is the
equivalent of a federal law. 90 If courts defer to executive interpretations,
then such a treaty becomes akin to a statute that means only what the
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (internal citation omitted)); Michael P.
Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892,

905-06 (2004) ("Under the Supremacy Clause, federal courts have not only the
right, but also the obligation, to enforce the provisions of self-executing treaties.").
85. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing treaties as "Law of the Land").

86. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that Senate alone has power to approve
treaties).
87. See, e.g., David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52
DEPAUL L. REv. 579, 595, 598 (2002) (arguing that if "sole purpose" of treaty were
to legislate domestic policy, treaty would be unconstitutional).
88. 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920) (holding that Congress may enact legislation
to implement non-self-executing treaty even though that same legislation, when
enacted without reference to treaty, was outside its enumerated powers).
89. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); see Santovincenzo v.
Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover
all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations .... "); Holland, 252 U.S.
at 433 ("We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power...
90. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring federal laws and treaties to be "Law
of the Land").
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President wants it to mean. It is one thing to let the President decide how
to interpret a treaty when dealing with a foreign country, but it is another
to let that interpretation dictate domestic meaning. Whatever desire for
unity may militate against judicial interference with international relations, interpreting a treaty qua statute is within the core judicial role.9 1 As
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist,the "true import" of treaties, at
least with respect to individuals involved in domestic litigation, "must, like
92
all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations."
The idea that executive interpretations of treaties warrant deference
in the name of a united voice is not confined to the judiciary. The legislature has also generally acted in accordance with the President's wishes
when it comes to treaties. Theoretically, Congress could refuse to enact
legislation necessary to implement non-self-executing treaties, but it has
rarely done so. 9 3 An early attorney general opinion weighed in strongly
about Congress's purported constitutional obligation:
A treaty, though complete in itself, and the unquestioned law of
the land, may be inexecutable, without the aid of an act of Congress: in which case Congress has never failed to enact the requisite laws, and so to recognise and to perform the duty imposed on
94

it by the Constitution.

That statement is remarkable, considering the lack of any constitutional
text compelling Congress to enact certain legislation. Following the lead
of the executive branch may sometimes be prudent, but to turn discretion
95
into a duty stands separation of powers on its head.
Of course, sometimes legislators will rebel. When legislative actors
dispute the executive's actions with regard to a treaty, the judiciary has
even less reason than otherwise to rubber-stamp the executive interpretation. If it does, it hands the executive branch the power to override not
only the judiciary but also the legislature. Yet this is precisely what the
91. See Van Alstine, supra note 80, at 1271, 1274-76 (arguing that because
some treaties create rights enforceable by individuals in domestic courts, and because Constitution makes treaties "law of the land" within an Article III court's
power of judicial review, courts may interpret treaties independently).
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
93. See 1 CHARLEs HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES 431 (1902) (noting that no treaty had been pledged by Union that had not
been fully carried out by Congress).
94. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 295-96 (1854) (emphasis added); see, e.g.,

HENKIN,

supra note 29, at 203 (citing Congress's "duty"). Even under the doctrine that
carved out an exception to the Supremacy Clause, making certain treaties non-selfexecuting, unexecuted treaties still bind the United States internationally-just
not the judiciary domestically. See id. at 203-04 (explaining that non-self-executing
treaties, while not binding on courts, still bind President and Congress).
95. See 2 BUTLER, supra note 93, at 382 (calling congressional deference "honorable" but acknowledging power of Congress to refrain from enacting implementing legislation).
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federal district court did in Kucinich v. Bush.96 In dismissing the suit by
representatives challenging the President's unilateral withdrawal from a
treaty on grounds of nonjusticiability, 97 the court cited the "embarrassment" that would result from "multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question."9 8 One person's multifariousness, however, is another's diversity. And one person's embarrassment is another's
pride in a system that places unchecked power in no single branch of
government.
The problem of potentially discordant voices is intractable without
eliminating the separation of powers altogether. Conceivably, the Framers
could have promoted unity by giving the judiciary approval power over
treaties. 99 Or they could have stripped federal courts of some of their
jurisdiction and given the executive branch the sole power to interpret
treaties in cases arising from treaties. But either move would have undercut the core principle that one branch of government should review the
acts of another. While the separation of powers doctrine has been rightfully praised as a pillar of our republican democracy, it does come with an
inevitable price to pay. 10 0 The fact that treaties are not always interpreted

96. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing representatives' challenges to
President's withdrawal from treaty). For a discussion of the Kucinich case, see supra

notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
97. See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15 (using nonjusticiability as grounds

for dismissing representatives' challenge). Under the guise of nonjusticiability,
courts sometimes do express opinions on the merits of the case. For example, in a
case addressing the same issue as Kucinich with regard to an earlier treaty, a splintered Supreme Court decision had the effect of dismissing the suit for raising a
nonjusticiable political question, but Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion left no
doubt about the merits: "[W]hile the Constitution is express as to the manner in
which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that
body's participation in the abrogation of a treaty." Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 1003 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). It may well be that the President has
the power to terminate a treaty unilaterally, but a court should not shroud its opinion on that matter in the mists of putative nonjusticiability.
98. Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)).
99. John Jay argued that even though treaties are law, they need not be made
only by legislators. After all, he pointed out, judgments of a court are just as legally
valid as acts of a legislature. See THE FEDERALisT No. 64, at 394 (JohnJay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
100. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that dilution of executive power may lead to corruption, whereas when power is centralized in single figure, that person has too much
personal stake in country's glory to commit treason); cf. HART, supra note 37, at
275-76 (calling cumbersome process for constitutional amendment inevitable
price to pay for system with checks and balances).
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domestically the way the executive would like is one of those prices, 10 1 but
10 2
it is hardly a reason to do away with our system of checks and balances.
Professor Yoo, who seems to envision unchecked power in the President, would apparently disagree. When viewed from the perspective of a
top-down government that brooks no internal disagreement, our system
may be, as he calls the notion that treaties can have diverse interpretations, "bizarre."10 3 But such is the nature of our constitutional structure.
Professor Yoo laments that treating important foreign affairs questions as
legal issues rather than purely political ones forces debates about treaties
to focus on "principle rather than policy. 1 0 4 Calling a matter one of important foreign affairs, however, is no justification for ignoring principles.
The President may interpret or even reinterpret a treaty one way in dealing with foreign nations, but when treaty interpretation questions appear
in cases or controversies before courts, judges should not shackle themselves. 105 If the President must apologize to his international counterparts
10 6
for the recalcitrance of domestic courts, so be it.
c.

Equivocal Accords

While an independent judiciary is good for the United States, it poses
problems for treaty partners. When negotiators from the executive
branch make promises to other nations, they lack the ability to ensure that
those representations are met. For example, the United States might
agree with another country pursuant to a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
101. Cf HENKIN, supra note 29, at 206 (acknowledging that although executive interpretations warrant "great weight," sometimes courts might properly interpret treaties differently, and calling that possibility "cost of the separation of
powers").
102. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 237 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (defending imperfections of Constitution by noting that "[n]o man
would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in
it").
103. SeeYoo, ABM Treaty, supra note 66, at 862 (noting that diverse interpretation may subject United States to onerous treaty provisions while granting treaty
partners more favorable standing). For a discussion of how treaties can have differing interpretations, see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
104. Yoo, ABM Treaty, supra note 66, at 863-64 (stating that treaties should be
interpreted by considering political policy).
105. See Van Alstine, supra note 80, at 1274 (noting that because treaties function internally as Article I legislation, they are and should be interpreted by
courts). Professor Van Alstine acknowledges that deference to presidential interpretation may sometimes be warranted but stresses that the judiciary has the ultimate interpretive power over treaties. See id. at 1277 (comparing deference owed
to executive branch by judiciary when interpreting treaties with deference owed by
judiciary to legislative branch when interpreting statutes, but noting that final interpretive authority rests with judiciary).
106. Scholars such asJohn Moore cringe at the thought of having an actor in
one branch of government put the United States in violation of its international
obligations. See Moore, supra note 70, at 184 (discussing Senate conflicts with executive branch). I, however, cringe more at the prospect of losing the benefits we
have from the separation of powers.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss1/2
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and Navigation (FCN) that either nation's companies doing business in
the other may hire personnel "of their choice."10 7 All involved in the negotiation and ratification might understand that phrase to mean that a
foreign company may consider applicants' national origin in making hiring decisions. But when litigation arises, a domestic court may read the
treaty-rightly or wrongly-to mean that a foreign company may consider
citizenship but not national origin. 10 8 The company may face a damages
judgment or an injunctive remedy. In situations like that one, the executive branch can do little (short of refusing to enforce the decision) but
offer diplomatic regrets to the treaty partner. That impotence inevitably
sounds a cautionary note to nations considering entering treaties with the
United States. Why make a pact with an entity that cannot be counted on
to deliver?
From the standpoint of a treaty partner, it is much easier to deal with
a dictatorship. If a dictator tells you that your country's nationals will be
treated a certain way, you can count on it, at least to the extent that you
trust the dictator's word.10 9 Fortunately, in the United States, not even
one whole branch of the federal government, let alone a single person,
can unilaterally control domestic activity. The inevitable by-product of the
separation of powers is that treaty negotiators are unable to make guarantees about internal affairs. Potential treaty partners are on notice of our
decentralized structure and our independent judiciary; as a result, they
might rationally hesitate before signing treaties with the United States.110
This point sounds less controversial in the context of other limitations
on executive power. For example, if the executive branch promises to sup'press political speech in favor of a group deemed by the international
community to be sponsoring terrorism, treaty partners should be aware
that, because of the First Amendment, the promise may be empty. 1
107. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
U.S.-Japan, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.

108. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140-41 (3d Cir.
1988) (interpreting FCN treaty that way).
109. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that treaty power must vest at least partly in President because President acting as "constitutional representative of the nation" is necessary
to gain "confidence and respect of foreign powers").
110. The Founders worried greatly about this problem, mostly in the context
of making sure that the new Constitution prevented states from being able to abrogate treaties. For a discussion of the Framers' views on the importance of strong
federal treaty power, see supra text accompanying notes 71-79. But few considered whether other branches of the federal government could be stopped from
undermining treaties, and I argue that as part of the separation of powers, the
answer is no. Joseph Story was one who worried about that issue, but he brushed
aside the anxiety about other branches as minor compared to the more pressing
concern of whether states might abrogate treaties on their own. See 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§

1837-1840,

quoted in 1 BUTLER, supra note 93, at 405-06.

111. Some have argued that the United States has entered many treaties that
violate the Constitution. See, e.g., ALBERT LtvrTr, THE PRESIDENT AND THE INTERNA-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 25

Likewise, the doctrine of lex posterior allows for the possibility that even if
the judiciary agrees with the executive's interpretation of a properly ratia
fied treaty, Congress may abrogate that treaty domestically by enacting
112
later statute (perhaps over a presidential veto) that conflicts with it.
Just as potential treaty partners must be wary of promises that violate
1 13
express constitutional norms and that might be overridden by statutes,
they must take into account the extent to which the separation of powers
dilutes the reliability of otherwise clear undertakings.' 14 When countries
83, 86 (1954) (proposing constitutional
amendment to make explicit requirement that all treaties and executive agreements comply with Constitution).
112. See Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458,
459 (1998) (noting that lex posterior rule causes "distrust of this country as a treaty
partner"). Indeed, in light of the institutional threats to treaties, it may seem surprising that countries enter treaties with us at all. AsJohn Jay wrote a bit pessimistically, arguing why treaties had to be part of the law of the land, "it would be
impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be
binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may think
proper to be bound by it." THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 394 (John Jay) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The fact that nations do enter such bargains despite the fact
that the law of the land can, in the domestic sphere, cede to the next law of the
land without any consultation with the treaty partner shows many things, such as
that treaties represent something beyond mere legal obligations, and that the
United States has the upper hand in bargaining power.
113. Although one might think that treaty partners would be on notice of
basic principles of U.S. law, sometimes they express shock. For example, in 1889,
the Supreme Court held that an 1888 statute prohibiting Chinese laborers from
returning after leaving the United States trumped an.1880 treaty under which the
United States promised that Chinese laborers would be "allowed to go and come
of their own free will and accord." Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 596-97
(1889) (affirming exclusion of individual from entry into United States pursuant
to statute). A Chinese diplomat expressed the country's outrage: "I was . .. not
prepared to learn ... that there was a way recognized in the law and practice of
[the United States] whereby your Government could release itself from treaty obligations without consultation with or the consent of the other party to what we had
been accustomed to regard as a sacred instrument." Letter from Chang Yen
Hoon, Minister Plenipotentiary of China, to James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of
State (July 8, 1889), 1890 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 132, 133,
TIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES

quoted in Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95
AM.J. INT'L L. 313, 317-18 (2001).
Likewise, when a 1988 U.S. tax statute expressly overrode any treaty to the
contrary, international reaction was bitter:
The violation of a ... treaty by unilateral action of one contracting party
undermines the basis of trust existing between the two countries involved,
erodes the certainty and security intended by international agreements
and ultimately poses the question as to whether an international convention . . . serves any purpose at all if it can be altered at will by one of the
contracting parties.
Memorandum from the [EEC] Group of Six on Certain Treaty Override Issues
(July 15, 1987), reprinted in 36 TAX NOTES 437 (1987), quoted inVagts, supra, at 320.
114. A similar dynamic arises with treaties that are unambiguously non-selfexecuting. For example, in the migratory bird treaty at issue in Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920) (establishing broad scope of permissible subject matter for
treaties), the parties "agree[d] themselves to take, or propose to their respective
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choose to enter treaties with the United States, they are forewarned, and
courts should not placate the executive's desire to give the nation a single
voice by abjuring interpretation.
2.

Separation of Obligations

Despite the potential unreliability of the United States, many nations
choose to enter treaties with it. When they do, they create a relationship
between sovereigns that is governed by international law. The resulting
obligation on the executive branch of the U.S. government is separate
from its domestic duties:'That obligation does not bind the judiciary.
The basic responsibility of the federal government is to manage the
country according to the Constitution, which bestows authority on it. "We
the People" are the beneficiaries of that obligation. The role of the judiciary branch as part of that government is to decide various cases and controversies, including those arising under federal law. Under the
Constitution, federal law includes treaties,1 15 and as the Supreme Court
has proclaimed, "[i]nternational law is part of our law."1 16 Thus, courts
have a constitutional obligation to interpret and apply self-executing treaties.1 1 7 But in the United States, international law, including that in treaappropriate law-making bodies, the necessary measures for insuring the execution
of the present Convention." Convention Between the United States and Great
Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VIII,
39 Stat. 1702, 1704. In such situations, the recognition of each party that the other
may not be able to convince the lawmaking bodies to enact necessary measures is
explicit. But in all U.S. treaties, the similar point that Congress might in the future
abrogate the treaty domestically is implicit.
115. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power to cases "arising under... Treaties"); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (including treaties in list of "supreme Law
of the Land"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (conferring federal question jurisdiction on civil actions "arising under ... treaties of the United States").
116. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (adding that international law "must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination"). See generally Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H.
Fox, Introduction: TransnationalJudicialSynergy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS,

supra note 65, at 1, 3 (recognizing increase in international

agreements since World War II and various international tribunals to enforce
them). The Paquete Habana rhetoric is rarely questioned, see, e.g.,
FRANK E.
HOLMAN, DANGERS or "TREATY LAw" 13-16 (1952) (urging constitutional amendment to prevent treaties from controlling over state laws and earlier federal statutes), but the details underlying it are hotly disputed. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1264 (2001) (predicting that
United States will eventually follow transnational trend of interpreting domestic
statutes in light of international law); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1555 (1984) (exploring ramifications of Paquete Habana dictum).
117. Indeed, though international law is at root a matter between sovereigns,
individuals often have a role in enforcing it through domestic court systems. See,
e.g., Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (giving district courts jurisdiction over actions brought by aliens for torts "in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
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1 18
To the extent that a treaty
ties, is not superior to the Constitution.
violates the Constitution directly or is superseded by later federal law,
courts must not enforce it; their paramount allegiance is to the
Constitution.

When the government, through the executive branch, enters into a
treaty, it incurs an additional, extraconstitutional obligation. The treaty
presumably will benefit "We the People," but we are only indirect beneficiaries. The principal obligee is the other nation. Regardless of what "We
the People" do domestically that might impair that obligation-including
the acts of courts or legislatures1 19 or states or private citizens-the inter120
Under internanational responsibility of the United States remains.
121
tional law, internal affairs generally do not excuse treaty violations.

note 29, §§ 906-907 (1987) (discussing circumstances in which private rights of
action arise); Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing InternationalLaw: The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. RPv. 433, 443-44 (2002) (arguing that
history of Alien Tort Claims Act shows that Framers concluded that allowing individuals to enforce violations of international law would help rather than hinder
U.S. foreign policy).
118. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) (stating that treaties entered
into by United States must comply with U.S. Constitution).
119. If Congress enacts a statute conflicting with an earlier treaty, the lex posterior doctrine bars courts from enforcing the treaty domestically, but does not control the executive branch. See Peter Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts
of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 H-Lv. L. REv. 511, 512-15 (1987)
(stating that domestic courts are required to uphold subsequent statutes over treaties but that treaties are still "lexically superior" and international duty under
treaty remains). As Professor Westen points out, the Supremacy Clause, which is
the root of lex posterior, provides that judges are bound by supreme laws but says
nothing of other branches, in stark contrast to the analogous provision in the Articles of Confederation. See id. at 513-15 (noting contrast between provisions).
Compare U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S.
1781). In other words, an earlier treaty does not become invalid in any broad
sense upon the enactment of a conflicting later statute; it merely becomes unenforceable in domestic courts. Westen, supra, at 516 (stating that domestic courts
are bound by subsequent statutes but that treaties must still be enforced by political branches of government).
120. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating that even
though treaty might no longer have force in U.S. courts, aggrieved nation "may
present its complaint to the executive head of the government, and take such
other measures as it may deem essential for the protection of its interests").
121. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 500, 506 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igusijudgment_20010625.htm (holding order to be binding despite protest by United States
that federal government could not control conduct of states); Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty."); cf. id. art. 46 (allowing internal law
to vitiate consent to be bound by treaty only if internal law is of "fundamental
importance").
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Though the enforceability of international law is a subject of extensive academic debate, 122 nations generally comply1 23 because violating
treaties brings repercussions. 12 4 Remedies for treaty breaches can take
many forms, but one way or another, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, "[t] he
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members." 125 For example, the foreign power might convince the
executive branch to exert pressure on the offending actor. 12 6 If that fails,
122. See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 121, 199 (Robert
Campbell ed., 1875) ("[T]he law obtaining between nations is not positive law; for
every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of
subjection to its author."); HART, supra note 37, at 3-7, 214 (concluding that because of its congruence with morality or justice, "international law" probably does
exist); HENKIN, supra note 36, at 19 (noting common view among diplomats that
principles observed by nations on international plane do not constitute "law");
Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law", 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1293
(1985) (answering "yes" to question in title).
123. See HENKIN, supra note 36, at 47 (noting that whereas violations of international law garner disproportionate amount of attention, nations obey their international obligations "almost all of the time"). But cf Benedict Kingsbury, The
Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19
MIcH. J. Ir'L L. 345, 346-47 (1998) (questioning whether notion that interna-

tional law is largely complied with has adequate empirical support).
124. See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001)

("[I] nfraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations,
so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war.") (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (discussing dangers of failing to abide by international law).
126. In 1906, fervor againstJapanese immigrants was sweeping San Francisco
as locals perceived that cheap foreign labor was undermining unions. THOMAS A.
BAILEY, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CRISES 43 (1934). A
newspaper editorial summed up the common sentiment: "We object to them.., as
we would object to any other moral poison." Id. at 36 (quoting S.F. CHRON., Nov.
6, 1906). A dramatic manifestation of that prejudice was a resolution by the city's
Board of Education to send all Japanese (and other Asian) children to a separate
school. See id. at 28-29. Outraged Japanese officials cited a treaty guaranteeing
citizens of each country "the same privileges, liberties, and rights" relating to "residence" as those of native citizens. Commerce and Navigation Treaty, Nov. 22,
1894, U.S.-Japan, art. I, 9 Bevans 387, 388. Livid, President Roosevelt vowed to
make San Francisco bend: "I shall exert all the power I have under the Constitution to protect the rights of Japanese . . . ." BAILEY, supra, at 81 (quoting cable
message). He even hinted at using the U.S. Army to back up his position. See id. at
100-01. Instead, he bartered a deal in which Congress limited Japanese immigration in exchange for desegregation of the San Francisco schools. See id. at 143-49.
Even so, resolving the crisis for good entailed a further campaign by the President
to convince the California governor not to approve new anti-Japanese measures.
Id. at 170-74.
David Golove cites this incident as an example of the historical rise of the
nationalist view of the treaty power: the view that the federal government controls
the execution of treaties. Golove, supra note 74, at 1249-54. But it serves equally
well as an example of how the best-laid plans of a federal executive can be undermined by renegade acts within the domestic sphere. There was certainly no guarantee that President Roosevelt would, or should, be able to keep San Francisco in
line with federal policy.
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the executive branch may end up simply apologizing. 127 If the treaty partner wishes to pursue a matter further, it may file a case with the International Court of Justice. It might mete out its own tit-for-tat diplomatic
128
In short, the obligation taken
sanctions, perhaps even starting a war.
on by the executive branch when entering a treaty is a serious one-but
one that does not directly bind the judiciary.
The duality of the federal government's obligations was described by
James Wilson during the Constitutional Convention of 1787: "Every nation
may be regarded in two relations, first, to its own citizens; secondly, to
foreign nations. It is, therefore, not only liable to anarchy and tyranny
29
within, but has wars to avoid and treaties to obtain from abroad.'
Along those lines, scholars have long debated the "monist" and "dualist"
views of international law.' 3 0 Monists see international law as part of every
3
country's internal legal system and in fact superior to domestic laws.' '
Dualists posit two distinct spheres of law. 13 2 According to strict dualism,
127. See, e.g., Press Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of
State (Nov. 4, 1998), available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ ps981104.html (stating that failure to notify prisoner of consular
rights was "unquestionably a violation" of U.S. obligation to Paraguay under Vienna Convention); cf.Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOzo J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 27, 31 (2000) (discussing apology to Paraguay). Occasionally, when an aggrieved individual does not challenge a state's action that violates a treaty, the
federal government simply apologizes for the anti-treaty acts of its members instead of initiating litigation against the state. See HENRIN, supra note 29, at 208
(reporting apology of federal government in 1956 to Japanese government for
South Carolina law burdening vendors ofJapan-made textiles in probable violation
of treaty).
128. 1 BUTLER, supra note 93, at 452.
129. Id. at 314.
130. See, e.g., ANTHONY AusT, MODERN TREAiY LAW AND PRACrICE 156-57
(2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, in INTERNATIONAL LAw DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 37, 63 (stating
that dualism "cannot be sustained");J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualismin the Theory of
InternationalLaw, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936) (analyzing both viewpoints from
positivist perspective).
131. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REv. 853, 864 (1987) (describing
monist view). Monists have been described as falling into two camps: those who
see the supremacy of international law as the most efficient way of protecting
human rights, and those whose position is based on formalistic logic and the unitarian nature of law. MALCOLM N. SHAW,INTERNATIONAL LAw 100-01 (4th ed. 1997)
(discussing two types of monists). Professor Henkin has stressed that the Framers
were essentially monistic in their view and that with increasing globalization, retreat to a dualist viewpoint would be bad policy. Henkin, supra,at 886 (concluding
that Framers' views were monist).
132. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th
ed. 1955) (detailing dualist view). This view is rooted in the work of various philosophers. For example, Rousseau noted that "the relation of the body politic to a
foreign Power is that of a simple individual." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social
Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 167, 183 (Gerard Hopkins trans., 1960) (1762). He
specifically declined to expound on the "vast" field of treaties between one state
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international law applies only to nations, not to individuals. 133 Most countries' treatment of international law is actually somewhere in between the
34

two extremes.1

The United States is no exception. 13 5 To the extent that it requires
treaties to be "executed," it is dualistic, but courts' acknowledgment of
"self-executing" treaties is a monistic view. 13 6 Regardless of the extent to
which one envisions international law as infiltrating a domestic legal system, the important point is that when the executive branch makes a treaty,
it incurs an obligation that is qualitatively different from its obligation to
the domestic populaceI 37 -an obligation that the judiciary does not share.
and another, but his writings leave the strong impression that states interact with
each other on an international plane much as individual citizens do within a state.
Id. at 307. Likewise, Montesquieu wrote that "[t]he life of states is like that of
men." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 20, at 138 (analogizing individuals' legal rights to
those of states under law of nations). John Rawls also viewed the international
plane as essentially another version of the domestic one. Just as an individual in a
society should decide such rules without knowing that individual's particular circumstances, he wrote, so should representatives of states decide international rules
without knowing that country's circumstances. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
378 (1971). But cf. id. at 8 (warning that law of nations may require special principles not applicable to notions ofjustice within a society).
133. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 914
(1986) (describing dualist view); Henkin, supra note 131, at 864-65 (discussing
differences between monists and dualists); George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, Supra note 65,
at 71, 73 (detailing dualist system). Jeremy Bentham ranks as the honorary father
of dualism on the basis of his definition of international law as "the mutual transactions between sovereigns as such." JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 6, 296 & n.x (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
1970) (excluding transactions involving individuals from province of "international jurisprudence").
134. See SHAw, supra note 131, at 127 (noting variety of countries' nuanced
positions in terms of relative status of treaties and domestic legislation); Henkin,
supra note 131, at 865 ("Few if any nations are either strictly monist or strictly
dualist.").
135. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1990) (noting that Supreme
Court has steered between extremes).
136. Most common law countries are dualistic in the sense that they recognize
no treaties as being self-executing. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 98-99 (3d ed. 1999) (describing English rule prohibiting self-execution of treaties). Indeed, the United Kingdom's system has been called "perhaps
the purist form of dualism." AusT, supra note 130, at 145, 151-54. Civil law countries are much more likely to grant explicit recognition of treaties as part and
parcel of domestic law, often in explicit constitutional provisions. SeeJANIs, supra,
at 101.
137. John Locke envisioned one governmental organ for orchestrating relationships among individuals and another one for managing the collective affairs of
that group of individuals in its interactions with other such groups: "[T ] hough in a
common-wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one
another, and as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the
rest of mankind, they make one body." LOCKE, supra note 71, § 145. Thus, he
described two distinct planes of relationships: one among citizens, and one among
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When a case arises under a treaty, executive branch actors may well
hope that the court does nothing to impair that additional obligation. In
a word, what they wish for is deference. After all, they are in a better
position than judges to know what interpretation of the treaty will suit
current foreign policy-which is not necessarily the same as the "correct"
interpretation of the treaty, to the extent that one exists. The court,
though, should not acquiesce to the executive's interpretation. Instead, it
should interpret the treaty only in light of its fealty to the Constitution.
The court has not taken on the separate obligation to another
3 8

sovereign.1

For example, the President may have decided for diplomatic reasons
that the language in an FCN treaty allowing foreign companies to hire
personnel "of their choice" exempts foreign companies from all employment discrimination suits. 139 But a court might properly read the treaty as

having a more limited effect. The court's duty to interpret the treaty as a
self-executing domestic law runs to "We the People," one of whom might
well be a wrongly rejected job applicant. Reading the treaty as the President desired would violate that duty.
In sum, courts should remember that their obligation is to apply the
Constitution. When the executive branch undertakes a separate obligation to another sovereign, the substance of that promise often becomes
domestic law that courts can enforce, but because that extraconstitutional
obligation is not directly incurred by the judiciary, courts need not appease the executive branch by deferring to its interpretations. If a court's
interpretation causes a treaty partner to complain of a violation, that partner will have recourse to various possible sanctions, formal or informal;
thus, courts should not worry overly about the plight of the international
obligee. In any event, better that courts apply the law at the possible expense of international obligations than bow to international obligations at
the definite expense of their constitutional duty.
3.

Separation of Interpretations

Occasionally, courts stand up to the executive branch. One judge
who did accept the general concept of deference directly challenged the
assumption that it was a code word for submission:
nations. The distinction between the planes is evident in the way Locke described
the management of them. Id. Although he favored the political consistency that
would result from having the same people administer both planes, he stressed that
two distinct powers would be wielded: a "federativepower' and an executive power.
Id. § 147. The executive power concerned the "laws of the society within its self,"
while the federative power managed the "security and interest of the public without."

Id. §§ 146-148.

138. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) ("[A]
court must enforce [a self-executing treaty] on behalf of an individual regardless
of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other nation.").
139. For a discussion of FCN treaties, see supra text accompanying notes
107-108.
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Implicit in the Government's posture is that its concept of "great
weight" necessarily must yield concurrence

....

Were this notion

to prevail, the Court's constitutional role and discretion in treaty
interpretation effectively would be reduced to that of a mere
echo of the Government's perspective

....

Even in articulation

the theory makes a mockery of constitutional separation of powers. Manifestly, its effectuation would spell doom for judicial
independence. 140
In my view, even a more limited notion of "great weight" can portend
similar doom. If a court would independently arrive at an interpretation
different from that of the executive branch but announces a decision consistent with the executive's view-in other words, if the deference is not
mere dicta-then the judicial role has been compromised. 1 4 1 Neither interpreter in such a situation needs to be wrong. Actors in the two
branches have unique responsibilities and operate under diverse restrictions and allegiances. 142 Judicial and executive interpretations of treaties
thus have reason to be different, and when they are, the judiciary has little
43
reason to back down.'
As long as courts retain their essential independence, there is nothing
wrong with using prudential discretion to weigh the position of the executive branch on occasion; declining to defer does not rule out consideration of others' opinions. After all, the executive branch negotiates treaties
and is in a better position than the judiciary to understand how they work
in practice. 1 44 Much as appellate courts respect the fact-finding of trial

140. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting
government's interpretation of Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
141. SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
(stressing Court's responsibility to interpret statutes rather than deem all sensitive
political cases as being nonjusticiable).
142. For example,judges act only when a case happens to come before them,
whereas the executive branch conducts its affairs more systematically. See Aharon
Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 16, 32 (2002) (discussing courts' consideration of sporadic nature of their
lawmaking). That distinction may partially explain judicial deference-why let
one case upset a carefully drawn scheme?-but still, when a case does come before
a judge, the episodic nature of litigation does not justify abstention.
143. One scholar has qualified his view that the judiciary should defer to executive authority on matters of international law by stressing that deference "must
not be achieved by sacrificing judicial independence." RICHARD A. FALK, THE RoLE
OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10 (1964) (arguing that

attitudes towards nations should not influence judicial outcomes). It is hard to
have it both ways, though. "Deference" presupposes the lack of a truly independent judiciary.
144. See Van Alstine, supra note 80, at 1298-1302 (arguing that structural advantages give executive interpretations more force for certain treaties and that type
of treaty dictates how much deference is warranted).
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judges who receive live testimony, 14 5 courts might recognize the particular
value of the executive perspective.
Moreover, a pitfall of the separation of powers is the potential for a
paralyzed government. 146 At some point, when the pragmatic need for
the nation to speak with one voice becomes particularly strong, 147 it may
be wise for the judiciary to echo the executive in the spirit of overlooking
one principle of the republic to save the whole. 1 48 Likewise, at times, a
court's own sustained legitimacy might depend on avoiding clashes with
the executive branch. Federal courts do not have their own armies to enforce judgments. 14 9 It is one thing to disagree with an executive interpretation in a case between private parties; it is another when the President is
a party. In direct challenges to executive authority, such as that in
Kucinich v. Bush,150 courts as a practical matter can reasonably take into
account their own long-term self-interest. But even then, they can reach
145. But see Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. Ruv. 1075,
1104-05 (1991) (describing scientific study showing that people judge credibility
better when reading written record than when hearing testimony from live
witnesses).
146. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting necessity of strong executive, especially to protect nation from foreign attacks).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10
(1801) (recognizing danger of international retribution if nation's treaty obligations are seen as being breached by court decision).
148. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,
1861), reprinted in 4 COLLIECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953) ("[A] re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself
go to pieces, lest that one be violated?") (criticizing Justice Taney's insistence that
Lincoln enforce one of his judgments); cf Termeniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (warning that practical logic sometimes must prevail over "doctrinaire logic" to prevent Constitution from becoming "a suicide
pact"). Recent legal scholars have sung the praises of pragmatism in a constitutional context as well. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (defending legal pragmatism); Robin L. West,
Liberalism Rediscovered: A PragmaticDefinition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PIrr. L. REv.
673 (1985) (detailing pragmatic liberalism and its benefits).
149. A similar point was stressed recently by a representative who urged Congress to amend an appropriations bill to ensure that no agency could use federal
funds to enforce a federal court decision declaring the placement of a monument
of the Ten Commandments in the Alabama Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. See 149 CONG. REc. 7277 (2003) (statement of Rep. Hostettler) (decrying
decision in Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)). When the Supreme
Court has defied the executive branch, however, the executive branch has generally complied. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (concluding that "needs ofjudicial process" outweigh presidential privilege); Neil A. Lewis
& David E. Sanger, Administration ChangingReview at GuantdnamoBay, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2004, at A9 (describing Bush administration's plan to comply with Rasul v.
Bush). Still, federal courts surely do not want to test those waters too often.
150. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). For further discussion of the dynamic
between the executive and judicial branches in treaty interpretation, see supra text
accompanying notes 56-58, 97-99.
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an accommodating result without invoking the damaging doctrines of deference or nonjusticiability.15 '
I am not decrying judicial deference to the executive interpretations
of all laws-only of treaties. For example, courts defer to agencies' interpretation of regulations and statutes. 15 2 Descriptively, that deference has
been a bit weaker than with treaty interpretation.153 Prescriptively,
though, it makes more sense. In that situation, Congress has explicitly
delegated the implementation of a statutory scheme to an executive
agency. To the extent that congressional intent concerning a statute is
meaningful, so is agency intent, because Congress may delegate that role.
As to any given statute, Congress comprises all the drafters. As to treaties,
in contrast, the executive is only one of the two (or more) parties to the
to
agreement. The executive's self-serving intent is thus less of a guide 154
what a treaty means than is Congress's intent as to what a statute means.
If courts were to assert themselves and interpret treaties independently, perceived violations of the international obligations of the United
States would not suddenly spike. Although the perspectives of the executive and the judiciary differ somewhat, cross-branch interpretations should
be fairly consistent. Executive interpretations will presumably tend to
favor results that maintain smooth diplomatic relationships with treaty
partners, and so will judicial ones, because the collective intent of the parties to a given treaty is likely cooperative as well. Along the same lines, it is
151. Cf Criddle, supra note 61, at 481-82 (concluding that although courts
should not blindly defer to executive interpretations, such interpretations can have

legitimate weight, particularly when treaty partner has ratified executive interpretation); Van Alstine, supra note 80, at 1268, 1298-1302 (arguing for "calibrated
deference" rather than "absolute judicial abdication").

152. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . ."); see also
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 701-07
(2000) (drawing parallel between Chevron deference and deference in treaty inter-

pretation, and explaining how deference can properly be limited).
153. For example, one quantitative study measured the level of Chevron deference by counting how often courts deferred to executive interpretations and put
that level at seventy-one percent. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 72
(1994-1995) (tabulating Supreme Court cases from 1981 through 1992). No similarly thorough analysis of deference to the executive's treaty views exists, but most
agree that defections are rare. See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 52, at 1015 (positing
that judicial deference to executive branch in treaty interpretation is expansive);
Criddle, supra note 61, at 459-60 (espousing same idea). But cf.John A. Townsend, Tax Treaty Interpretation, 55 TAX LAw. 219, 257 (2001) (equating tax treaty
interpretation with statutory interpretation in terms of deference). Examples of
cases in which the Supreme Court defied the executive branch include Perkins v.
Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 335-42 (1939) (disagreeing with Secretary of State's interpretation of naturalization treaty with Sweden), and Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5,

10-12, 18 (1936) (limiting executive power under extradition treaty with France).

154. But seeJames C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudenceof Treaty Interpretation,
21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1023, 1051 (1988) (arguing that more judicial deference to
executive branch is warranted with treaties than as to statutes).
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unlikely that courts will read treaties in ways that cause violations of other
norms of international law. Treaty drafters presumably intend their work
product to comply with those norms; after all, the documents they write
are themselves an important part of international law. 155 Courts' interpretations ought to reflect that intent. 156 In short, disdaining deference
would hardly be cataclysmic for foreign policy.
Even when judicial interpretation does deviate from that of the executive branch, disdaining deference would not cause the chaos that some
fear. The Framers' main concern about courts and treaties was the "hydra" problem 157-that the voices of multiple courts would turn foreign
policy into a cacophony. But that problem will not rear its head because
the independent judiciary has one ultimate arbiter. And that unitary
head, the Supreme Court, unlike many countries' highest courts, considers itself bound by stare decisis.1 58 Therefore, although the federal judiciary might speak with a voice different from that of the executive, that voice
is stable enough to help maintain positive foreign relations. 1 5 9 The inconstancy of treaties need not spawn instability of interpretation within a single branch of government. With that in mind, courts should fulfill their
constitutional duty to interpret treaties without being cowed into silence.
They need not be indifferent to executive interpretations, but nor should
they be deferent.

155. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38,
para. 1 (a), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter I.CJ. Statute] (listing treaties as source
of customary international law).
156. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (stressing that interpretation of treaties must take place by considering ordinary meaning of terms "as understood in the public law of nations"); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,
419-20 (1886) (interpreting treaty in light of "recognized public [international]
law"); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817) ("[T]he law of nations... is
always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties."); cf Vienna Convention,
supra note 121, art. 31, para. 3(c) (directing interpreters to consider "any relevant
rules of international law").
157. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stressing importance of a unitary judiciary rather than "[t]hirteen
independent courts," especially for cases arising from treaties).
158. See PETER

DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAw IN A CHANGING WoRLD

243-47 (2d

ed. 1999) (distinguishing treatment of precedent in common law and civil law
systems).
159. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 391-92 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (indicating role of federal judiciary in foreign relations). In explaining why
the President and the Senate held the treaty power, Jay emphasized that the nature
of the power was such that it should not be entrusted to a body with fast turnover,
namely the House of Representatives. Id.; see THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450, 452
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that "particular nature" of treaty power justified "peculiar propriety" of President and Senate over
House, with its "fluctuating" views and "multitudinous" membership).
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B.

Undue Inference

Courts also should avoid unwarranted deference to the legislative
branch. Under the lex posteriordoctrine, conflicts between self-executing
treaties' 60 and federal statutes are resolved in favor of the later document. 16 1 In Dred Scott v. Sandford,16 2 Justice Curtis expressed doubt that a
treaty could be supreme to later-enacted federal law,' 6 3 and thirteen years
later, the Supreme Court formally recognized the doctrine.' 64 Judges
often shrink from its harsh effect, though, by interpreting treaties and statutes as being consistent with each other.' 65 To the extent that this policy
of harmonization has any theoretical foundation, it would seem to be a
presumption that when legislators enact statutes, they are aware of existing
treaties and do not, absent indications otherwise, intend to abrogate them.
But congressional silence does not readily support such an inference.
Most likely, when weighing statutory language, legislators give little consideration to ensuring the continued domestic viability of treaties. Such was
160. The lex posteriordoctrine logically applies only to self-executing treaties.
See Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 44, 50 (1913) (discussing
application of lex posteriordoctrine); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 29, § 115 cmt. c (1987) (distinguishing non-self-executing treaties). The Supreme Court rarely invokes this gloss on the rule. See JORDAN J.
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 82-83 (1996) (explaining Supreme Court's stance on issue). Still, it would make little sense to say that a
treaty is non-self-executing and yet has the effect of negating federal legislation.
Most likely, the Court simply forgets that some treaties are non-self-executing. Certainly, it also forgets sometimes that some treaties are self-executing. See Van Alstine, supra note 80, at 893-94 (noting that in disclaiming existence of federal
common law, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), inexplicably omitted treaties in list of sources of law for federal courts).
161. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
162. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
163. See id. at 629 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (discussing inconsistent treaty and
law).
164. See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) (determining that proper redress is with Congress). Before the ratification of the Constitution, John Jay argued against this weakening of treaties; in his view, only a later
treaty by the same parties could change the nature of such an agreement. See
Nelson, supra note 75, at 256 n.95 (conveying different views on resolution of
treaty-statute conflicts). Though the lex posterior doctrine stems from a questionable analysis of the Supremacy Clause, a full analysis of its merits is beyond the
scope of this article.
165. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951) (reading treaty in
way that avoided direct conflict with later statute); MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,
863 F.2d 1135, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1988) (interpreting treaty provision allowing for-

eign companies to hire personnel "of their choice" not to conflict with ban on
employment discrimination based on "national origin" because treaty permitted
hiring decisions based on only citizenship, not national origin); Whitney, 124 U.S.
at 194 ("[Clourts will always endeavor to construe [treaties and statutes] so as to
give effect to both."); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains ....");see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 114 (1987) (suggesting that
courts construe statutes not to conflict with treaties when "fairly possible").
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the case in Ropes v. Clinch,1 6 6 one of the earliest clean examples of lex
posterior.167 In 1832, the United States had entered into a treaty with Russia providing most-favored-nation treatment for duties on Russian
goods. 168 In 1861, Congress enacted a law that imposed a duty of forty
dollars per ton on Russian hemp and twenty-five dollars per ton on Indian
hemp. 16 9 The Ropes plaintiff, who had paid the higher duties on Russian
hemp under protest, sued the duty collector on the theory that any duty
above twenty-five dollars per ton violated the treaty. The plaintiff advanced the theory that although Congress had enacted the disparate duties, it had not intended to abrogate the treaty with Russia. 170 The court
indignantly rebuffed that argument as tantamount to saying that "congress
did not intend that [the statute] should have the effect which necessarily
follows from enforcing it."17 1 Reading the statute as written, the court
72
held for the duty collector.'
Still, the court clung to the idea that reconciliation was generally a
good idea: "[I]f the [statutory] language were doubtful ....

it would be

the duty of the court to look at the treaty, and, if it be possible to find an
interpretation of the statute which will involve no infraction of the
treaty. .. , to give it that interpretation, and without hesitation."' 73 Had
the court succumbed to that temptation, it might have presumed that in
drafting the duty statute, Congress had interpreted the treaty to mean
something that would not have conflicted with the statute-for instance,
as carving out an exception for hemp. Such a presumption would have
been baseless because in fact, the legislators had not even read the treaty
at all: once the discrepancy became news, Congress amended the statute
to eliminate the conflict.174 Yet courts make such unwarranted inferences
whenever they strain to avoid treaty-statute conflicts. They should recognize instead that, as with the hemp statute, the assumption that legislators
have drafted a statute in light of their interpretation of relevant treaties is
likely to be false.
Moreover, even if legislators have in fact interpreted old treaties as
reconcilable with new laws, judges are entitled to their own opinions and
need not strain to achieve an artificial ideal of harmony-between the laws
166. 20 F. Cas. 1171 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 12,041).
167. See id. at 1175 (holding that court was bound by congressional act).
168. See Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 18, 1832, U.S.-Russ., art.
VI, 8 Stat. 444, 446.
169. See Act to Provide Increased Revenue from Imports, ch. 45, § 1, 12 Stat.
292, 292 (1861) (declaring that additional duties apply to goods such as sugar, tea,
coffee, silk, and hemp).
170. See Ropes, 20 F. Cas. at 1171.
171. Id. at 1173.
172. See id. at 1175 (holding that court was bound by congressional act).
173. Id. at 1172-73 (advocating for reconciliation of both treaties).
174. See Act to Reduce Internal Taxes, ch. 255, § 21, 16 Stat. 256, 264 (1870)
(unifying duty at twenty-five dollars per ton after duties in Ropes were paid).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss1/2

36

Glashausser: Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpetation

20051

DIFFERENCE AND DEFERENCE

or between the branches. 17 5 Pointing out conflicts may make violations of
international obligations through congressional acts starker and thereby
cause the executive branch to have to make amends. 176 Straightforward
interpretations, however, are preferable to spurious ones.1 77 Foreign policy may suffer, but such is the price we pay for the separation of powers.
When courts reconcile a treaty with a later statute by inferring that legislators must have read the two laws to be in harmony, they improperly defer
to congressional interpretation.
IV.

INTERCOURT INTERPRETATIONS OF TREATIES

Treaty interpretation can legitimately diverge not only across different branches of government, but also among courts with different institutional roles. In discussing the role of courts in protecting democracies,
Aharon Barak, president of Israel's Supreme Court, noted the importance
of context in judging: "[A] judge who develops the law does not perform
an individual act, isolated from an existing normative system. The judge
acts within the context of the system, and his ruling must integrate into
it."1

78

Indeed, a judge decides cases on behalf of a court, and the nature of
the court can and should influence outcomes. When courts resolve the
same interpretive question about a treaty differently, both courts may, in
175. Under the "non obstante" provision of the Supremacy Clause, state judges
are bound by treaties and federal laws, "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. At the time

of the drafting of the Constitution, such provisions were a common way of telling
interpreters not to try too hard to harmonize conflicting legal rules. Nelson, supra
note 75, at 232. The lack of a similar provision relating to conflicts between treaties and statutes might lead one to believe that interpreters should strive to find
concordance. But that view would ignore the function of the Supremacy Clause.
It addresses the supremacy of the national government over state government
when legal norms of the two clash, and the non obstante provision furthers that
interest. The Clause is not about conflicts between federal norms. Therefore, it is
not surprising that there is no such provision, and little should be read into its
absence.
176. See Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1914) (noting that if
Congress passes later law that abrogates treaty, "[t]he other nation may have
ground for complaint, but every person is bound to obey the law"); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supranote 29, § 115(1) (b) (1987) (noting contin-

uing international obligation despite abrogation of treaty by later domestic law).
But see Vagts, supra note 112, at 458-59 (warning of recent trend of executive
branch not to make any attempt at reparations when nation breaches international
obligation through action such as court decision).
177. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS § 203 cmt. c (1981)

("If a

term or contract is unconscionable or otherwise against public policy, it should be
dealt with directly rather than by spurious interpretation."); Roscoe Pound, The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 REP. OF A.B.A.
395, 408 (1906) ("[T]o interpret an obnoxious rule out of existence rather than to
meet it fairly and squarely by legislation is a fruitful source of confusion.").
178. Barak, supra note 142, at 30.
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light of their diverse perspectives, be correct. 179 Thus,just as deference to
the executive branch is unwarranted, the U.S. Supreme Court (and lower
federal courts) should not give undue weight to the decisions of other
courts interpreting treaties. Specifically, despite globalization and the
rush to harmonize legal systems, U.S. courts should not cede their authority to the International Court ofJustice. But neither should they ignore it.
The most appropriate level of respect is somewhere between indifference
and deference.
A.

Heterogeneous Heuristics

Historically, the principles of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts have
differed somewhat from those in the International Court of Justice. The
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, and by extension the lower federal courts, has developed somewhat haphazardly.18 0 As with the interpretation of statutes and contract, the basic starting point has been the
text. 181 In reading the text of treaties, the Court has considered the context of the specific terms at issue. 18 2 The Court's willingness to depart
183
from the text has varied through the years.
When the Court does examine extratextual sources, it sometimes considers a treaty's "preparatory work" (often referred to as travaux
18 4
praratoires),
as well as legislative history from the domestic ratification
18 5
process
and subsequent conduct of the parties. 186 The Court has also
considered treaties' purposes, but usually to add unnecessary support to its
179. Cf MONTESQUIEU, supra note 20, at 9 (arguing that because of differences among nations in climate, culture, and other factors, laws that are appropriate to govern one are rarely appropriate to govern another). But cf. FALK, supra
note 143, at 93 (arguing that factors unrelated to merits should not affect adjudication and that cross-court uniformity of outcomes would "improve the quality of
international justice").
180. For a fuller discussion of the treaty interpretation jurisprudence of the
U.S. Supreme Court, see Glashausser, supra note 15 (manuscript at 5-18).
181. See, e.g., Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1985) (indicating that
treaty analysis begins with specific words and with context in which they are used).
183. Compare O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 30-31 (1986) (calling
textual support for result "subtle" and relying on "contextual" evidence), and Air
France,470 U.S. at 395-96 (deciding question about Warsaw Convention in light of
negotiation history, subsequent conduct, and other nations' interpretations), with
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-70 (1989) (citing various nontextual
sources, but basing holding purely on text).
184. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,
700-02 (1988) (using negotiating history to bolster holding that because Illinois
law allowed service on foreign corporation via its American subsidiary, Hague Service Convention did not apply); AirFrance,470 U.S. at 400-03 (discussing preparatory work at length even though that history merely confirmed what was already
"evident" from treaty's text).
185. See, e.g., Soci&6t Nationale Industrielle Akrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522, 529-32 (1986).
186. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996)
(espousing same idea); AirFrance,470 U.S. at 403 ("Reference to the conduct of
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conclusions, not to serve as the foundation for them.18 7 More specific
interpretive canons articulated by the Court include the rule that if practicable, meaning should be given to all provisions in a treaty.188 Likewise,
the Court prefers treaty constructions that are "effective" and favorable to
rights claimed under a treaty over those that restrict rights.' 8 9 Of course,
as discussed above, perhaps its most important doctrine of treaty interpretation has been that of deference to the executive branch. 190
Unlike the Supreme Court, the International Court of Justice relies
heavily on a codified guide to interpretation: the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. 191 Even if the parties to a dispute before the Court
have not ratified the convention, the Court often applies it as customary
law. 192 As explained by its drafters, the convention anoints a strong version of textualism: "[T]he text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, and . . . in consequence, the

starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the
193
text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties."
That approach sprung from precedent in the International Court, which
194
was already perceived as having adopted textualism.
the parties ...and the subsequent interpretations of the signatories helps clarify
the meaning of [a] term.").
187. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 704-05 (rejecting argument that purpose of Hague Service Convention undermined Court's conclusion that domestic
law controlled whether service of process on foreign defendants had to follow
convention).
188. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 270 (1890).
189. See, e.g., Nielsen v.Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) ("When a treaty provision fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging, rights
which may be claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be
preferred . .

").

190. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's deference to the executive
branch, see supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
191. For a fuller discussion of the treaty interpretation jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, see Glashausser, supra note 15.
192. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1059 (Dec.
13); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 812 (Dec. 12) (holding that Article 31 of Vienna Convention is "customary international law"); Territorial Dispute
(Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21-22 (Feb. 3) (same).
193. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second Part of ItsSeventeenth Session,Jan. 3-28, 1966, and on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, May 4-July 19, 1966, reprinted in 61 Am.J. INr'L L. 248, 354 (1967)
[hereinafter ILC Reports] (commenting on draft article 27, which became article
31) (referring to approach adopted as "textualism"); see also Shabtai Rosenne, Interpretation of Treaties in the Restatement and the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles: A Comparison, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 221 (1966) (noting that provisions on interpretation were "designed to stress the dominant position of the text
itself in the interpretative process").
194. ILC Reports, supra note 193, at 354 ("[T]hejurisprudence of the International Court contains many pronouncements from which it is permissible to
conclude that the textual approach to treaty interpretation is regarded by it as
established law."); see BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Libya, 53 I.L.R. 297, 332 (Arb.
1973) (viewing Vienna Convention as codification of existing customary interna-
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Article 31 of the convention sets out the basic standard: "A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose. 1 95 The convention does allow for the use of evidence of "subsequent practice" of the parties, as long as that practice "establishes the agreement of the parties regarding [the treaty's]
interpretation." 196 Interpreters may also consider a "subsequent agreement" about interpreting or applying the treaty, 19 7 as well as "any relevant
rules of international law." 198 A second article on interpretation erects
strict hurdles before consideration of other extratextual sources is appropriate.' 99 That standard has tethered interpreters to the text more than
U.S. courts traditionally have done. Though some have noted the International Court's unpredictable mix of formality and flexibility, 200 its treaty
interpretation doctrine has mainly been rooted in the textualism reflected
20 1
in the Vienna Convention.
tional law); Criddle, supra note 61, at 446 (calling principles enshrined in Vienna
Convention "already well entrenched in customary international law"); Morse,
supra note 37, at 42 (noting that in 1950s, International Court favored textualism).
But cf BRIERLY, supra note 37, at 325 (calling intentionalism touchstone of treaty
interpretation in 1960s); James F. Hogg, The InternationalCourt: Rules of Treaty Interpretation, 43 MINN. L. REv. 369, 441 (1959) (citing intent of parties as focus of
International Court's inquiry before Vienna Convention).
195. Vienna Convention, sup-a note 121, art. 31, para. 1.
196. Id. art. 31, para. 3(b).
197. Id. art. 31, para. 3(a).
198. Id. art. 31, para. 3(c).
199. Id. art. 32. Article 32 provides as follows:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application
of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id.
200. See, e.g., IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
117, 153 (2d ed. 1984) ("[W]idely differing results can still be achieved even if a
conscious effort is being made to apply the Convention rules."); Edward Gordon,
The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 794,

833 (1965) (criticizing Court for purporting to base interpretations on settled
principles while actually reaching politically desirable results); E.W. Vierdag, The
International Court ofJustice and the Law of Treaties, in FIY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 145, 162 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,
1996) (discussing multifaceted nature of Supreme Court's approach to treaty interpretation); cf. LUNG-CHU CHEN, supra note 9, at 269 (calling Vienna Convention's approach an "eclectic" mix of textualism and contextualism).
201. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v.
Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 112, 121-22 (July 1) (refusing to give any weight to statement of
foreign minister because of purported clarity of text); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 632 (5th ed. 1998) (describing Court's textualism).
But see Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 53-54 (Oct. 16) (relying on diplomatic correspondence in holding that Morocco's sovereignty did not extend to certain area,
despite treaty providing that area "belong[ed]" to Morocco).
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The policy of the U.S. Department of State has been to treat the Vienna Convention as "the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice." 20 2 And federal courts have cited a national policy to treat the
convention as customary international law, which theoretically implies that
the convention is the law of this land.2 0 3 Still, the United States has not
ratified the convention, and the Supreme Court has cited it only sporadically. 20 4 Although the principles of the Vienna Convention and the practice of the International Court do not diverge drastically from American
treaty interpretation jurisprudence, 20 5 some salient differences have
emerged. For example, U.S. courts tend to ignore the convention's focus
on principles of customary international law. 20 6 Overall, the substantive
approach of the International Court, through the convention, is more textual; in terms of form, it is more hierarchical. 20 7 As a result, U.S. courts

202. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 92-1, at 1 (1971), quoted in United States v. Yousef,
327 F.3d 56, 94 n.28 (2d Cir. 2003).
203. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002).
204. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993)
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for ignoring plain meaning of convention); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 325 cmt. a
(1987) (noting that Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations section tracking Vienna
Convention's approach to interpretation "does not strictly govern interpretation... by courts in the United States [but] represents generally accepted principles [that] the United States has appeared willing to accept"); Criddle, supra note
61, at 433-34 (noting that Court has cited the convention only twice, including
once in dissent). State courts and other federal courts have been more likely to
rely on the convention. Id. at 434.
205. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations has adopted many interpretive
principles from the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 325 (1987) (importing significant aspects of Article 31 of Vienna Convention). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations notes that
its section on interpretation suggests principles "somewhat different" from those
ordinarily applied by U.S. courts. Id. § 325 cmt. g. Other principles in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations stem from the practice of federal courts, which tend
to focus less on the text than the Vienna Convention would suggest. See, e.g., RE.
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 326(2) (1987) (noting
"great weight" due executive interpretations).
206. Vienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 31, para. 3(c) (directing interpreters to take into account "any relevant rules of international law").
207. See REUTER, supra note 70, at 74-75 (praising Vienna Convention's "carefully and subtly graduated elements" that guide interpreters to parties' intentions
through primacy of text). The United States manifested its desire for a less textualistic approach during the drafting of the Vienna Convention. The U.S. representative on the drafting commission proposed combining articles 31 and 32 into a list
of parallel interpretive factors to avoid the apparent hierarchy of sources and water
down the textualisin. That proposal, though, was soundly rejected. See Richard D.
Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 519-20
(1970) (noting that one basis for rejection was concern that wealthier nations such
as United States would have better access to extratextual sources); Rosenne, supra
note 193, at 221 (reporting that concerns about diluting textualist approach fueled
rejection of proposed amendment).
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tend to consult extratextual sources a bit more readily than they would if
20 8
they followed the convention.
B.

The Influence of the International Court of Justice

Courts in foreign countries vary in terms of how often and how respectfully they cite decisions of the International Court of Justice as evi20 9
Compared with
dence of international law about treaty interpretation.
other domestic court systems, U.S. courts have given perhaps the least deference to the decisions of international tribunals such as the International
Court.2 10 In cases involving private law, when no particularly salient na21 1
but as a
tional interest is at stake, U.S. courts have sometimes deferred,
general matter, courts in this country have been much more reluctant to
cede their judicial power to international tribunals than to the executive
branch.
Deference to judgments of the International Court can take at least
three forms. The lowest level occurs when U.S. courts treat those judgments as merely persuasive evidence of what international law is. Courts
2 12
A more robust form
have accorded this type of deference on occasion.
208. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 325
reporters' note 4 (1987) (noting subtle contrast in "emphasis and presentation"
between U.S. courts' intentionalism and interpretive approach of Vienna Convention); Bederman, supra note 52, at 975 ("The overall effect of the Vienna Convention on American treaty jurisprudence has been to check slightly the use of extratextual means of interpretation."); Gallant, supra note 70, at 1094 (describing U.S.
Supreme Court interpretation as "more open" than what Vienna Convention calls
for); David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of
Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353, 1385 n.132 (1989) (describing interpretation in U.S. courts overall as less text-bound than interpretation under Vienna Convention).
209. See Sarita Ordonez & David Reilly, Effect of the Jurisprudenceof the International Court of Justice on National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAw DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 335, 344-45, 365. Institutional factors such as the
nation's constitution, statutes, and custom play a role in affecting how that nation
will treat decisions of the International Court. Id. at 345.
210. Franck & Fox, supra note 116, at 5-6. The "perhaps" is a necessary qualifier because the issue of the reception in domestic courts of the decisions of any
international tribunal has "scarcely been studied at all." Mohammed Bedjaoui, The
Reception by National Courts of Decisions of InternationalTribunals, in INTERNATIONAL
LAw DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 21, 21-22; see also Yuji
IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAW 107-08 (1998)
(noting dearth of scholarship on this subject).
211. Franck & Fox, supra note 116, at 10. Not surprisingly, "municipal courts
are more inclined to acknowledge the applicability of [a decision by an international court if it] favours its government or its nationals." Bedjaoui, supra note
210, at 32.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 99, 103 n.18 (1986) (relying
on two International Court decisions as evidence of international law in holding
that Nantucket Sound belongs to United States); United States v. Louisiana, 394
U.S. 11, 43 n.55, 69-71 & n.93 (1969) (relying on International Court decision to
help interpret Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone); Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing International Court's
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of deference involves giving weight to International Court judgments in
cases involving a common party. For example, in National Airmotive v.
Iran,2 1 3 the government of Iran was defending a claim for breach of contract. It moved for a stay on the grounds that in light of a presidential
order banning travel between the United States and Iran, its American
counsel could not obtain necessary factual information.2 1 4 In denying the
motion, the court noted that Iran's own conduct in the hostage crisis had
provoked the travel ban. 2 15 The International Court's judgment that such
conduct was unlawful was a significant factor in the district court's deci2 16
sion to deny the motion for stay.
The most extreme form of deference entails treating International
Court judgments and orders as binding. Such deference is relatively
rare.2 1 7 For the most part, U.S. courts have resisted the notion that they
must obey International Court rulings.2 18 The most dramatic example of
that resistance has been the turf battle over the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. Under that convention, national authorities must inform arrested or detained foreigners "without delay" of the right to con219
tact their consulate.
In 1993, Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted
of a capital offense by a Virginia court and sentenced to death. 2 20 In a
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Breard argued that he should
be freed because at the time of his arrest, nobody had notified him of his
right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. 22 1 That petition failed at the
explanation of jus cogens); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (relying on International Court's determination that seizure of United
States embassy in Tehran violated treaty between United States and Iran); United
States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1461-62 & n.18 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (giving some weight to International Court's advisory decision but disagreeing with its holding).
213. 491 F. Supp. 555 (D.D.C. 1980).
214. Id. at 556.
215. Id. at 556 n. 7 .
216. Id.
217. A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J.
INr'L L. 877, 886 (2000). For example, a court in Morocco once treated an International Court decision as binding precedent on the issue of whether Americans
were subject to the jurisdiction of French courts in Morocco. Administration des
Habous v. Deal, 19 I.L.R. 342, 343 (Ct. App. Rabat, Morocco 1952). According to
Yuji Iwasawa, a Japanese trial court, in dicta, once referred to International Court
decisions as binding on domestic courts; on appeal, although the trial court's judgment was affirmed, the appellate court ordered the deletion of that dicta.
IWASAwA, supra note 210, at 113 (detailing procedural history of case).
218. See, e.g., Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
934 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that individuals cannot challenge failure by United
States to comply with International Court judgment).
219. Consular Convention, supra note 1, art. 36, para. 1(b).
220. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682 (Va. 1994) (affirming
Breard's capital murder conviction and death sentence).
221. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (E.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing Breard's position for writ of habeas corpus).
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trial and appellate levels on the ground that Breard had procedurally de222
Breard then petifaulted by not raising his argument in state court.
223

tioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
A week and a half before the scheduled execution, Paraguay initiated
a case in the International Court, alleging that the United States had violated the Consular Convention. The International Court responded almost immediately with a provisional order: "The United States should take
all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation
of this Order."22 4 In light of that order, 22 5 Breard petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court to stay his execution pending the final International Court
decision. In Breard v. Greene,22 6 the Supreme Court denied that petition,
22 7
as well as his petition for certiorari, on the day of Breard's execution.
The Supreme Court grudgingly acknowledged the International
Court's order: "[W]e should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with
jurisdiction to interpret such." 228 That dictum, however, was tellingly buried in a subordinate clause. The Supreme Court gave more respect to its
own analysis of international law, holding that the Consular Convention
was by its own terms subject to domestic rules about procedural defaults
and thus could not save Breard. 22 9 Aside from whatever substantive merit
that interpretation may have had,2 30 the opinion was remarkable for its
casual dismissal of the International Court's authority. It was not that the
Supreme Court found international law to be irrelevant; rather, it found
its own view of international law to be more relevant than that of the Inter222. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1998) (barring claim
due to procedural default).
223. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
224. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.CJ.
248, 258 (Apr. 9).
225. Despite the use of what seem like precatory terms, the International
Court has held that such orders are binding. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2001 I.CJ. 466, 500-06 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/igus/igusjudgment/ igus-ijudgment_20010625.htm.
226. 523 U.S. 371 (1988).
227. See id. at 378-79. Breard was executed hours after the Supreme Court

issued its opinion. See David Stout, Clemency Denied, ParaguayanIs Executed, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at A18.

228. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
229. See id. at 375-77 (explaining that domestic rules accounted for Breard's
failure to establish that violations of convention were prejudicial).
230. See generally id. The Supreme Court relied on the convention's provision
that it "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State" while glossing over the qualification that such laws and regulations
"must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights [to contact
the consulate] are intended." Id. at 375.
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national Court-so much that it was not even willing to await a final
judgment.
That final judgment arrived in a different case arising under the same
circumstances. 231 In the LaGrand Case 2 3 2 two German brothers were convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Arizona court.233 Their
federal habeas corpus petitions asserting failure to notify them of their
rights under the Consular Convention were rejected for procedural default. 23 4 The day of the scheduled execution of one of the brothers, the
International Court issued a provisional order to the same effect as the
one in the case brought by Paraguay on behalf of Breard,2 35 but the Supreme Court again denied an application for stay, 23 6 and the execution
went forward. 23 7 In its final judgment, the International Court held that
the United States had breached its obligations to Germany and to the
brothers. 2 38 According to the Court, the Consular Convention created individual rights of action, and the application of the procedural default
23 9
rule in the United States violated the convention.
When the Supreme Court had occasion to revisit this issue in a later
case, Torres v. Mullin,2 40 it refused to rethink its stance from Breard.2 4 1 In a
case brought by a citizen of Mexico who was on death row in Oklahoma
and raising the same issue as that in Breard and LaGrand, the Court denied
231. At the request of Paraguay, the case involving Breard was taken off the
docket of the International Court. International Court of Justice, Press Release
98/36, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
232. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/
igus-ijudgment_20010625.htm.
233. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987) (affirming lower court's
death sentence).
234. See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging Arizona's failure to notify LaGrands of their rights, but holding that issue was
procedurally defaulted because of failure to raise it in state proceedings).
235. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICJ/1999/1.html (issuing order stating that
United States should take all measures to ensure that execution would not take
place).
236. See LaGrand v. Arizona, 526 U.S. 1001 (1999).
237. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 479-80 (noting dismissal of case due to domestic jurisdictional barriers).
238. See id. at 494 (explaining individual rights that were violated by United
States). The decision about the private right of action was a surprise to some because of the International Court's reputation as being "state-centered." See Lori
Fischer Damrosch, Is InternationalLaw Part of U.S. Law? Understandingan Awkward
Relationship: Interpreting U.S. Treaties in Light of Human Rights Values, 46 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 43, 57 (2002).
239. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98 (elaborating that procedural default
rule failed to give convention its full intended effect).
240. 540 U.S. 1035 (2003).
241. See id. at 1036 (noting tension between Breard holding and Vienna
Convention).
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certiorari. 242 Preceding that denial was not only the International Court's
final judgment in LaGrand,but also a provisional order in a case brought
by Mexico directing the United States to take whatever measures necessary
243
to ensure that the prisoner was not executed before a final judgment.
In Torres, Justice Stevens cited the International Court's ruling in
LaGrand and pointed out that allowing the procedural default rule to overcome individuals' rights under the Consular Convention permitted states
to put the nation in violation of its treaty obligations. 24 4 Justice Breyer, in
dissent, more squarely addressed the relationship between the Supreme
Court and the International Court. He acknowledged that, as the United
States argued, the International Court "does not exercise any judicial
power of the United States, which is vested exclusively by the Constitution
in the United States federal courts." 245 But he wondered whether the
United States might have delegated that power to the International Court
by entering into treaties: "The answer to Lord Ellenborough's famous rhetorical question, 'Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of
the whole world?' may well be yes, where the world has conferred such
binding authority through treaty." 246 In light of that uncertainty, Justice
Breyer advocated postponing the decision until after the final International Court judgment. 24 7 In that final judgment, the International Court
248
reaffirmed its holdings from LaGrand.
Unlike the brother in that case, though, the Mexican petitioner was
spared, as Oklahoma was more solicitous than the Supreme Court of the
decision of the International Court. After the International Court's final
judgment, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered that the petitioner receive a new hearing. 249 The governor then commuted the sen242. See id. at 1035 (denying writ of certiorari); see also Vasquez v. State, 793
A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001) (citing procedural default as proper basis for refusal to
consider claim based on rights under Consular Convention, despite ruling to contrary by International Court in LaGrand).
243. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2003 I.C.J. 1 59 (Feb. 5), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusorder/imus-iorder_ 20030205.PDF (ordering United States to keep International Court informed of measures taken).
244. See Torres v. Mullin, 157 L. Ed. 2d 454, 454-55 (2003) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (explaining that procedural default rule conflicts with Vienna Convention and is fundamentally unfair).
245. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Breyer,J., dissenting) (citing Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546
(KB. 1808)).
247. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting international implications of issue
and need for further evaluation).
248. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128, 1 40, 112-114 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imus/ imusjudgment/imusjimusjudgment_20040331.pdf.
249. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OKLAHOMA, Court of Criminal Appeals Grants Stay of Torres Execution, at http://www.acluok.org/TakeAction/ OsbaldoTorresStory.htm (reporting decision of May 13, 2004, ordering hearing to
determine "whether [the petitioner] was prejudiced by the State's violation of his
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tence to life without parole. He did not mention the International Court
specifically but did "t[ake] into account the fact that the U.S. signed the
1963 Vienna Convention [on Consular Relations] and is part of that
treaty." 250 For other prisoners in similar situations, though, as well as any
individuals who may have private rights under treaties, the question still
remains about the extent to which U.S. courts should take into account
the judgments of the International Court.
C.

Sovereignty and Supremacy

Though deference to the International Court of Justice may sound
like a natural value in the age of globalization, U.S. courts should remember that the source of their authority is the Constitution, ratified with the
consent of "We the People." 25 1 Just as courts should interpret treaties
without abdicating their responsibility to the executive branch, they
should hesitate before surrendering to the siren song of universalism at
the expense of their constitutional duty. Treaties are malleable enough to
mean different things to different courts, and thus even when an International Court interpretation is correct, a court in the United States can
reach a different decision without being wrong. Undue deference would
strip away the sovereignty of the United States.
The judicial power of the United States extends to the federal
courts.2 52 In cases that arise under federal law, including treaties, those
courts have the final say and need not defer to the interpretations of other
courts. For example, if a domestic court of a treaty partner has interpreted a treaty one way, the U.S. Supreme Court need not defer to that
interpretation (or to the desire of the executive branch that it do so), any
more than it must defer to an interpretation by a state court about federal
law. 25 3 The other domestic court's interpretation might be wrong, and
Vienna Convention rights in failing to inform [the petitioner] after he was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate").
250. Id.
251. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
252. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.").
253. Just as it is appropriate to use discretion in weighing the opinion of the
executive branch, it makes sense for courts to at least consider, if not defer to,
treaty interpretations by foreign domestic courts. The Supreme Court considers
such decisions with some regularity. See, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,
525 U.S. 155, 175-76 & n.16 (1999) (citing decisions from Canada, New Zealand,
and Singapore to confirm exclusivity of Warsaw Convention's remedies); Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1995) (supporting interpretation of Brussels Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading by citing lack of contrary decisions by domestic courts of
any parties to convention); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128,
134-35 (1989) (interpreting Warsaw Convention in manner consistent with holding of Supreme Court of Canada); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985)
(citing French court's decision about meaning of term "accident" in Warsaw Convention and noting that interpretations in courts of treaty partners are "entitled to
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moreover, even if it is not, a proper interpretation in a U.S. court might
2 54
Coundiffer in light of the different institutional forces acting on it.
tries recognize that reality; they routinely sign multilateral treaties despite
knowing that interpretations will likely vary greatly from one domestic
255
court system to another.
It may be easy to conclude that U.S. courts need not defer to parallel
courts in other nations. But what respect is due the judgments of the principal tribunal purporting to transcend domestic courts-the International
Court of Justice? 256 Questions of federal law theoretically are susceptible
to a single definitive answer. Supreme Court holdings are binding, and
when it has not addressed an issue, lower federal courts as well as state
courts are charged with following its precedent and sitting in its shoes to
predict what it would decide.25 7 Is international law similar in that domestic courts should treat International Court precedent as binding and sit in
its shoes when addressing novel questions of treaty interpretation?
Justice O'Connor has hinted that beyond state law and federal law,
international law sits atop the legal hierarchy:
Just as state courts are expected to follow the dictates of the Constitution and federal statutes, I think domestic courts should
faithfully recognize the obligations imposed by international law.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives
considerable weight") (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978)).
A decision of a foreign domestic court may shed light on a treaty partner's
understanding of what a provision means. Indeed, consistency across domestic
courts may be a more worthy goal than deference to the International Court. If a
provision is reciprocal, and the partner's court has interpreted it in a way that
restricts rights for U.S. nationals, then a U.S. court might well interpret the provision as restricting rights for nationals of the treaty partner, on the theory that such
interpretation would be consistent with the general goal of reciprocity.
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 325
reporters' note 4 (1987) (noting inevitability of difference in interpretation in different countries' domestic courts).
255. See, e.g., Jamie Smyth, Government to Sign Crime Treaty Despite Concerns,
IRISH TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at 59 (noting Ireland's plan to sign cybercrime treaty
despite uncertainty stemming from fact that "[e]ach state's interpretation of the
text of the treaty is likely to differ substantially"). The doctrine of margin of appreciation is an explicit example of this effect. For an examination of the background
of the doctrine of margin of appreciation, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
256. The International Court ofJustice is the preeminent international court,
with broad subject matter jurisdiction. Cf SHAw, supra note 131, at 745 (calling
International Court "by far the most important" international tribunal).
257. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) (insisting that lower courts follow Supreme Court precedents rather than
predicting future overruling); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823
(2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., dissenting) ("[T]he measure of [a lower court's] duty is
to divine, as best it can, what would be the event of an appeal in the case before
it.").
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legal force to treaties, and our status as a free nation demands
2 58
faithful compliance with the law of free nations.
She values the "federalist ideal of healthy dialogue and mutual trust" as a
model for the relationship between domestic and international courts. 259
Indeed, what she envisions is nothing short of "the federalism of free nations." 260 To be sure, she stops short of saying that U.S. courts should
defer to the opinions of the International Court. But if the relationship
between domestic courts and international law is akin to that between
state courts and the Constitution, it would hardly be a stretch to conceive
of a subordinate role for U.S. courts. 261 Indeed, that was the possibility
broached by Justice Breyer in considering the impact of International
262
Court decisions about the Consular Convention.
U.S. courts, though, should not succumb to subsidiarity. 2 63 To begin
with, the International Court is not the unquestioned final arbiter in matters of international law. 2 64 It does happen to be the one permanent international (as opposed to merely supranational) court with general
jurisdiction; its decisions, however, are inherently no more authoritative
about international law than the decisions of a temporary arbitral panel or
258. O'Connor, supra note 65, at 18.
259. Id. at 17; see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146
U. PA. L. REv. 687, 732-33, 792-93 (1998) (arguing that federal courts should seek

"cooperation among domestic courts on an international level" to achieve "transnational" body of law).

260. O'Connor, supra note 65, at 17-18 (elaborating on idea that international law should develop through dialogue between national and international
tribunals) (quoting Immanuel Kant, The Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
441 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949)). Justice O'Connor does acknowledge that the
analogy breaks down to the extent that nations are not as closely intertwined as our
states, but rather are closer to "a loose confederation of sovereign states." Id. at 18.
261. Congress has explicitly agreed to such subordination in certain limited
circumstances, such as when it agreed to subject U.S. judicial rulings to review by
supranational tribunals in certain cases arising under the North American Free
Trade Agreement. See Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by Nafta Tribunals Stirs
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at Al (describing surprise of American judges at
review of their decisions).
262. For a discussion of Justice Breyer's views about international jurisdictional relationships, see supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
263. See Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 209, at 344-45 (noting that relationship
between International Court and other courts "has few parallels" and "is unlike the
interaction of courts of first instance and appellate courts within a single legal
system"). But see Franck & Fox, supra note 116, at 4 (arguing that synergy between
international and domestic courts sometimes approaches "that found in a mature
federal system" and that United States should strive for that goal by deferring more
to international tribunals).
264. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 28, at 280-81 (citing International Court's
lack of centralized authority to be final arbiter on matters of international law as
major problem with its contribution to international law); Henkin, supra note 116,
at 1562 ("[International law] is determined primarily and more authoritatively by
international courts and with equal authority by domestic courts .... ").
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even the decision of a domestic court. 2 65 The International Court is a
tribunal parallel to others, not above them. A hierarchy of the sort that
places the U.S. Supreme Court at the top for interpretations of federal
26 7
law 2 66 is simply not in place for international law.
Moreover, even if an international consensus were to emerge that the
International Court is the final arbiter of international law, the United
2 68
States has never consented, explicitly or implicitly, to that condition.
Through the ratification of the Constitution, the thirteen original states
accepted the authority of the Supreme Court and federal law under Article III and Article gI.269 Later, states made the same decision when they
chose to join the union. The United States has never made a like decision
to have its own courts bow to another as to all matters of international law.
Indeed, the Constitution bars Congress from delegating "the essential attributes of the judicial power" to non-Article III courts. 270 Furthermore,
the Constitution does not elevate international law as enunciated in trea265. Domestic courts are accepted as tribunals that can properly help develop
international law. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 775 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Until international tribunals command
a wider constituency, the courts of the various countries afford the best means for
the development of a respected body of international law."); 1 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 132, at 32 (" []udgments of municipal tribunals are of considerable practical
importance for determining what is the correct rule of International Law."). But
cf Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939) (stating that domestic court rulings
have no effect on international law). Even if international tribunals eventually
command a wider constituency, the International Court will not necessarily be
considered the final arbiter of international law. In fact, the sources of international law are nonhierarchical enough to lead some to argue that a President can
violate existing international law to make new international law. See Charney, supra
note 133, at 914, 917. Otherwise, goes Professor Charney's argument, the United
States can play no role in effecting change in international law. See id. at 914.
266. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring supremacy ofjudiciary in interpreting federal law); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is."). With respect to other courts in the United States, the Supreme
Court also is the final arbiter of international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, § 112(2) (1987) ("The determination and interpretation of international law present federal questions and their disposition by
the United States Supreme Court is conclusive for other courts in the United
States.").
267. See Charney, supra note 133, at 914, 917 (describing international law as
nonhierarchical). In fact, unlike U.S. Supreme Court decisions, International
Court judgments purport to be binding on nobody but the parties to the case. See
I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 59.
268. SeeYoo, Treaty Interpretation, supra note 66, at 1334-35 (noting constitutional problems with scheme in which judgments of foreign courts would have any
more precedential value to federal courts than those of state courts or parallel
circuits).
269. See Weisburd, supra note 217, at 892-900 (arguing that Constitution forbids any arrangement that would make federal courts subservient to International
Court).
270. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932).
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ties to a position of supremacy over federal law. 2 71 Thus, neither the text
nor the structure of the Constitution suggests that federal courts (or any
courts in the United States) should defer to an international body's
272
interpretation.
Even to the extent that the U.S. government has consented to the
jurisdiction of the International Court,2 73 that consent is only to have the
Court resolve the nation's international obligations. As to domestic application of treaties, the U.S. Supreme Court has ceded no control. If the
International Court, in a proper exercise of its jurisdiction, renders ajudgment against the United States, failure to abide by it is a violation of international law. That does not mean, however, that U.S. courts are bound to
obey judgments of the International Court.
In such a scenario, the executive branch has agreed that the nation
will be bound by those judgments; because of the separation of powers,
though, the executive branch does not have the capacity to strip thejudiciary's power and to make federal courts subservient to others. Just as the
judiciary does not share the obligation of the executive branch to another
nation when the executive negotiates a treaty, 274 federal courts do not

incur an extraconstitutional duty to defer to another court in their domestic application of treaties when the executive agrees to have the nation
bound by the judgments of the International Court.275 That reality may

271. Rather, the two are considered parallel; hence the lex posteriordoctrine.
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888) ("By the Constitution, a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that international
law as applied in the United States is subject to the restraints of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957).
272. See Weisburd, supra note 217, at 933-34 (noting that despite common

academic assumption that international law must trump domestic law, there is no
justification for arguing that U.S. courts must defer to judgments of international
tribunals). Federal courts do defer to state courts' interpretation of state laws. See
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (citing requirement of specific authorization before interfering with states). That doctrine, however, has constitutional roots in the Tenth Amendment.
273. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 36, paras. 1-2 (defining International Court's jurisdiction). All members of the United Nations are parties to the
International Court. U.N. CI-IARR art. 93, para. 1. The Court has jurisdiction,
however, only when parties consent. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 36, paras. 1-2. Nations can consent to jurisdiction broadly, under "optional compulsory
jurisdiction" in individual cases; or through a treaty in which they agree to accept
the jurisdiction of the Court for any disputes that arise. See id. The United States
has consented to the Court's jurisdiction under several dozen treaties. See HENKIN,
supra note 29, at 267 (indicating specific instances).
274. For further discussion of the Supreme Court's deference to the execu-

tive branch on matters of foreign policy, see supra Section III.A.2.

275. See Weisburd, supra note 217, at 882-85, 889 (arguing that I.C.J. Statute

did not intend to create direct domestic effect of judgments but rather leaves enforcement by Security Council as sole mechanism of implementation).
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but it is a price we pay for the separation of

powers. 277 Globalization already has its discontents, 278 and an indepen2 79
dent judiciary should not become another one.
Thus, in the language of Justice Breyer's dissent in Torres,2 80 the Island of Tobago can pass a law to bind the rights of another nation if that
other nation confers such authority. But when that other nation is one of
separated powers and it is the executive branch alone that confers such
authority, the judiciary is not bound. Many academics have criticized the
reluctance of the United States to defer to International Court judgments
in the Consular Convention cases, 28 1 but that reluctance does have a valid
basis. 28 2 Conflicting interpretations of treaties by different courts are no
more absurd than inconsistent decisions about federal law among the various circuits. Multiformity may not be ideal, but it preserves the rights of
different courts to act within their proper spheres, without having to defer
276. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 374-75 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing how judicial decisions could affect diplomacy). Decisions by
federal courts are hardly the only way to frustrate diplomatic policy. In a government of checks and balances, it is impossible for the President to embark on foreign policy without any reins. For example, the Senate could refuse to ratify a selfexecuting treaty; Congress could refuse to enact legislation necessary to implement a non-self-executing treaty; or Congress could enact later legislation that
would trump the treaty domestically under the lex posteriordoctrine. See id. (Scalia,
J., concurring) (explaining how presidential power can be limited).
277. For further discussion of the impact of the separation of powers on
treaty diplomacy, see supra Section III.A.1.
278. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 6
(2002) (arguing that globalization has benefited rich countries' commercial interests at expense of developing countries).
279. But cf John B. Attanasio, Of Sovereignty, Globalization,and Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 373, 394 ("The
over-arching trend... is away from sovereignty and toward a greater acceptance of
a variety of supranational decision-making authorities ....");Ordonez & Reilly,
supra note 209, at 371 (opining that domestic courts should follow International
Court judgments, paying "a small price" of loss of discretion in exchange for
strengthening law of nations).
280. See supratext accompanying note 245 (quoting from Justice Breyer's dissent in Torres).
281. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, ProvisionalMeasures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the
States, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 679, 681 (1998) (arguing that International Court's provisional order was binding on President); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 708-09 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court should have
stayed execution out of comity or civility, if not compulsion). In a different context, many have also written that treaties must have the same meaning domestically
and internationally. For citation of sources arguing to that effect, see supranote 70
and accompanying text. That position is tantamount to saying that if the International Court has interpreted a treaty, U.S. courts must follow that interpretation.
282. I do not necessarily agree with the result of the Supreme Court's Consular Convention cases, and I acknowledge that it can be useful to know the position
of the International Court on an issue of treaty interpretation, just as it can be
useful to know the position of the executive branch. I do, however, agree with the
Supreme Court's implicit insistence that it need not defer to any other court when
applying a treaty as domestic law.
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unnecessarily to the rulings of others. And because of the nature of treaties, the interpretations of those different courts might all be correct.
D.

Vive la Diffrence

Not only should U.S. courts not defer to judgments of the Interna-

tional Court of Justice, but compared with interbranch interpretations,
there are more reasons for substantive results to diverge, in light of different institutional forces. 283 The legal contexts in which U.S. courts and the
International Court operate vary starkly. Most importantly, U.S. courts
constitute a branch of a national government, 284 whereas the International Court is a product of the United Nations. 285 As a result, treaty interpretation by U.S. courts has been described as "nationalist" compared with
the "internationalist" approach of the International Court. 286 While the

International Court is neutral between parties to a treaty, U.S. courts have
incentives to shade their interpretations in ways that favor the United
States. 287 U.S. judges apply treaties as domestic law and fall back on their
Anglo-American jurisprudential background to inform their interpretation, but judges of the International Court naturally rely, to an extent, on
288
the legal culture of their own domestic legal systems.
283. See Barak, supra note 142, at 30 ("A supreme court judge must consider ...the powers and limitations of the institution of the judiciary as defined
within that system . . . ."); cf. Robert S. Summers, Introduction, in IrERPRETING
STATuTEs: A COMPARATrVE STuDY 1, 3 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers
eds., 1991) (making same point as to statutory interpretation). But cf.JANIS, supra
note 136, at 29 (expressing general hope that different interpreters reach same
results).
284. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (creating judicial branch of federal government). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations reflects this reality, noting that
certain materials may be considered by U.S. courts that might not be considered
by the International Court, such as documents shedding light on the Senate's understanding of a treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 29, § 325, reporters' note 5 (1987) (suggesting that U.S. courts look at committee reports, debates, and other legislative materials).
285. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92 (describing International Court as "principal
judicial organ" of United Nations).
286. See Criddle, supra note 61, at 436-37, 446, 464 (explaining nationalist
and internationalist approaches to interpretation and application of international
law). David Koplow has suggested that perhaps treaties really have three versions:
one in each signatory country and one on the international plane. See Koplow,
supra note 208, at 1411 n.236 (conceptualizing treaties as "three overlapping but
independent bodies of law").
287. See Wolf, supra note 154, at 1040 ("It is entirely appropriate-and the
polity so expects-that domestic law reflect the interests of the domestic constituency."). Such favoritism can come in innocuous forms; for example, in considering preparatory work, U.S. courts are likely to focus disproportionately on records
compiled by the U.S. Department of State. See id. at 1038 (discussing U.S. courts'
approach to treaty interpretation).
288. Cf Patricia McGowan Wald, Judging at the Hague, JUD. DIVISION REC.,
Summer 2002, at 19, 20 (chronicling experience sitting on Yugoslav War Crimes
Tribunal and noting that "judges tend to rely on their own instincts which hark
back to their own legal cultures").
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Preeminent in the legal culture of U.S. judges is the Constitution.
The basic framework governing International Court judges is the U.N.
Charter,29 0 but peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law also
inform interpretation. 291 As a coequal branch of government under the
Constitution, the U.S. judiciary faces pressure to defer to the executive
branch to facilitate the nation's foreign policy. 292 The International
Court does not come under that sort of pressure. 29 3 It also lacks the
289. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957) ("This Court has regularly
and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.").
290. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (directing International Court to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be maintained"); id. art. 103 (providing
that treaties are invalid if they conflict with country's obligation under U.N.
Charter).
291. Under the Vienna Convention, a treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law. SeeVienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 53. The content of peremptory norms is a bit murky. See
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5)
(singling out genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination as violations of "obligations erga omnes" owed apart from any treaty "towards the international community as a whole"); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.CJ. 4,
296 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka) (suggesting that "the law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the jus
cogens"). In fact, the International Court has never struck down a treaty as violating
a peremptory norm. See AUsT, supra note 130, at 258 ("There are no reported
instances of [the provisions of the Vienna Convention on peremptory norms] being invoked."); SINCLAIR, supra note 200, at 209 (stating that International Court
judgments have referred to concept of peremptory norms only in individual opinions and dissents).
292. See Koplow, supra note 208, at 1392-99 (describing interrelationship of
three branches with regard to treaties). Though I have argued that U.S. courts
should not have a policy of deference to the executive branch, I have acknowledged that under certain circumstances, they may rightfully exercise prudential
discretion to consider the views of the executive. For that discussion, see supratext
accompanying notes 146-54.
If the U.S. Supreme Court, like the International Court, were able to render
advisory opinions, the separation of powers problem could conceivably disappear,
at least temporarily. See U.N. CHARTER art. 96 (allowing certain entities to request
advisory opinions on legal questions); I.CJ. Statute, supranote 155, art. 65, para. 1
(allowing organizations, but not states, to request advisory opinions); Letter from
the Supreme Court Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), quoted in Robert P. Dahlquist, Advisory Opinions, ExtrajudicialActivity andJudicialAdvocacy: A HistoricalPerspective, 14 Sw. U. L. Rv. 46, 60 (1983) (advising President Washington,
in response to request for judicial advice, that Supreme Court does not have power
to render advisory opinions or otherwise give advice). During the Senate's advice
and consent process, it could ask the Court for an advisory opinion about what the
treaty would mean. The Senate could then decide to withhold consent unless the
judiciary's interpretation was consistent with that of the executive branch. Of
course, such temporary harmony could be upset later through executive reinterpretation or an overruling of precedent.
293. Even when matters before the International Court are concurrently
before political organs of the U.N., the Court has not declined to exercise its judicial function. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 431-34 (Nov. 26) (refusing suggestion that Court
should abstain from hearing case); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
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power to conduct 'judicial review" of the actions of other organs of the
United Nations. 29 4 The difference in political pressure faced by judges in
the two systems is reflected in the devices that protect their independence.
295
Whereas International Court judges are elected for nine-year terms,
29 6
federal judges are appointed for life.
The executive branch is not the only other governmental entity that
can interfere with the treaty interpretation of U.S. courts. Congress can
complicate matters by enacting legislation that conflicts with treaties, raising the specter of treaty nullification under the lex posterior doctrine. Although I have argued that courts should not stretch to harmonize treaties
and statutes, 29 7 they do as a descriptive matter, and it may be inevitable
that legislative acts affect judicial interpretations of treaties. The International Court is not subject to a corresponding influence. That Court also
need not concern itself with the subtleties of federalism. In LaGrand, the
United States argued to the International Court that its federal structure
prevented the government from compelling states to comply with the Con298
sular Convention, but the Court brushed aside that argument.
Ingrained judicial approaches also vary between the United States
and The Hague. Most notably, the International Court theoretically limits
Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3, 22 (May 24) (stressing importance of Court judgments in leading to peaceful resolution of difficult political situations). But for
reference to the Court's occasional reluctance to wade into politically charged issues, see infra note 308 and accompanying text.
294. See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21) ("Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of
judicial review .

.

. in respect of the decisions taken by .

.

. United Nations or-

gans .... ); f., e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 439
(Sept. 13) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) ("[T]he Court's power ofjudi-

cial review [of actions of the U.N. Security Council] is limited.").
295. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, arts. 3, 4, 13. International Court judges
are subject to other measures that promote independence. See id. art. 16, para. 1
(barring judges from other professional work); id. art. 18, para. 1 (barring dismis-

sal without unanimous vote of rest of court); id. art. 19 (granting diplomatic privileges and immunities); id. art. 32, paras. 5, 8 (decreeing that salaries may not be
decreased during term and are tax-free).
296. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges hold office "during
good Behaviour").
297. For that argument, see supra Section III.B.
298. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 500, 506 (June 27),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/
igus-judgment-20010625.htrm (holding provisional order to be binding over protest by United States). It may not be coincidence that after LaGrand, the International Court changed the standard language it uses in provisional orders. Compare
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J.
59 (Feb. 5), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/ imusorder/
imusiorder_20030205.PDF (ordering United States to "take all measures necessary" to prevent execution), with LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16
(Mar. 3), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICJ/1999/1.html (ordering United States to "take all measures at its disposal" to prevent execution).
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the reach of its judgments to the case at hand,299 whereas U.S. courts generally abide by the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine produces more
stable, if not more correct, case law over time. Along the same lines, the
U.S. Supreme Court's institutional role favors creating law for the future.
Each year, it grants only approximately two percent of petitions for writ of
certiorari; 30 0 in doing so, it considers which cases will have the widest impact beyond the individual litigants. 3 0 1 In contrast, the focus of the International Court is largely on the case before it. After all, each dispute is
between nations and is weighty enough on its own. These diverse perspectives may affect the different courts' interpretations.
30 2
Though the International Court's jurisdiction is not discretionary,
it does not hear nearly as many cases as the Supreme Court, and as a result, it can (and does) spend years on cases and write tomes about each
one.3 03 The International Court thus has the time, as well as the institutional inclination, to investigate foreign legal systems. 30 4 Moreover, U.S.
courts are understandably Anglocentric. The International Court conducts its official business in English and French, and its fifteen judges hail
from fifteen different countries. 305 It is no stretch to suggest that the In-

299. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 59 (providing that Court decisions
bind only parties); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General
Principlesof InternationalLaw", 11 MICH.J. INT'L L. 768, 816 (1990) ("[The International Court] seem [s] to have avoided including the types of formulations in [its]
opinions that may lead to the notion that [its] opinions could be deemed the basis
for future jurisprudential development."); Ordonez & Reilly, supra note 209, at 342
(noting that nonexistence of legislature to overrule wrong decisions mitigates
against stare decisis in international courts). The International Court does, however, often refer to its own precedent in a way that suggests that it values precedent
to some extent. See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J.
17, 27 (May 26) (noting that although judgments bind only parties, an earlier decision can be considered as "a statement of what the Court regarded as the correct
legal position"). Moreover, despite the lack of formal stare decisis, the Court's decisions can help create international law. See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 38,
para. 1(d) (citing "judicial decisions" as source of international law).
300. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 2003, tbl. B-2 (2003), at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2003/ appendices/b2.pdf (compiling statistics through Sept. 30, 2003).
301. See Sup. CT. R. 10 (listing considerations governing review on certiorari).
302. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 36 (conferring jurisdiction on International Court without mechanism for Court to decline cases).
303. See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, List of Cases Brought Before the Court
Since 1946, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (providing links to text
of opinions in cases brought before International Court) (last visited Oct. 20,
2004).
304. Van Alstine, supra note 259, at 786 n.409 (noting how unrealistic it would
be to expect U.S. judges to have thorough appreciation of foreign legal systems).
One cause of U.S. courts' lack of deference to International Court judgments may

be that courts in the United States are not as familiar with the procedures of international courts as are the domestic courts in other nations. Franck & Fox, supra
note 116, at 9 (commenting on varying degree of familiarity with international
tribunals in U.S. courts).

305. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 3, para. 1 (listing requirements for filling judgeships).
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ternational Court might take more seriously the need to compare versions
of documents in multiple languages. 30 6 In short, institutional resources
may play a role at the margins of the outcome of cases.
A final factor that may affect the way courts interpret treaties is the
likelihood of compliance. The U.N. Charter provides for the possible use
of force to back up the judgments of the International Court, 30 7 but even
though some Court judgments are openly flouted, 30 8 that possibility has
never become a reality.3 0 9 Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that once
it issues ajudgment, enforcement is largely a political issue. 310 Therefore,
31
the Court sensibly may decide cases with one eye on its own legitimacy. '
After all, any tribunal at times must consider whether stepping lightly
is necessary to preserve its own power. 3 12 The U.S. Supreme Court is not
immune to that dynamic-its order to desegregate schools "with all deliberate speed" 3 13 has been seen by many as an acknowledgment of the limitations of its influence 314 -but overall, U.S. courts have fewer concerns
than the International Court about the execution ofjudgments. That in306. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 68
(July 20) (comparing English "taken" with Italian "espropriati" in interpreting
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 2, at 19-20 (comparing English "control" with
French "contrle).
307. U.N. CHARTER art. 94. Under that article, a state trying to compel compliance may have recourse to the Security Council. See id. (providing for recourse
upon failure to perform judgment obligations).
308. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7, 21 (Dec. 15) (ordering "immediate release" of U.S. hostages as
provisional measure), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 44 (May 24) (ordering that Iran "immediately
terminate the unlawful detention" of U.S. hostages).
309. See Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of InternationalAgreements, 23 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 193 (1994) (explaining argument that international law is,
as practical matter, unenforceable).
310. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. UK), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 37 (Dec. 2)
(discussing reach ofjudgments by Court).
311. See Dugard, supra note 61, at 465 (accusing International Court of repeatedly "seeking refuge in technical niceties in order to escape a politically explosive issue"). The concern about perceptions of legitimacy probably reached its
high-water mark with the Iran case. See B.A. Ajibola, Compliance withJudgments of the
International Court of Justice, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 9, 20-21 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) (opining that Iran's
flouting of Court's judgment "weakened the effectiveness, importance and very
purpose of the Court").
312. Though U.S. courts need not defer to the executive's interpretation,
there is no guarantee that the executive will enforce the judiciary's decisions. Cf
Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REv.
1205, 1207 (1988) (arguing that "President is not bound by international law").
313. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
314. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFICT 301-03 (1992)

(opining that passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964 bolstered legitimacy of Brown-era
Court); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correctingthe
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REv. 397, 438 (1999) (criticizing Court's "timidity" in failing to order desegregation aggressively).
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stitutional confidence can translate into bolder pronouncements about
what treaties mean. In the Consular Convention cases, if the U.S. Supreme Court had ordered a state to stay an execution, there is little doubt
that the state would have complied. Conversely, when the International
Court has ordered the United States to halt an execution, it has largely
been ignored.3 1 5 It would hardly be surprising if the Court weighed the
impact of its past words when choosing future ones.
E.

Independence Without Ignorance

Though U.S. courts should not defer to treaty interpretations of the
International Court ofJustice, they can retain their independence without
ignoring those decisions. Just as discretionary consideration of the views
of the executive branch can be appropriate,3 16 judges should resist the
temptation to toss international tribunals aside as would-be usurpers of
their authority. Domestic courts must not delegate their constitutional responsibility to decide cases. Instead, they can and should educate themselves about the jurisprudence of the International Court on the way to
reaching their own conclusions.
As Anne-Marie Slaughter has written, "the phenomenon of transjudicial communication is a pillar of a compelling vision of global legal
relations."3 17 She has criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's insularity31and
8
I
suggested "cross-fertilization among legal systems" as a laudable goal.
agree that only good can come of efforts to consider how other courts
have dealt with universal legal issues. 31 9 U.S. courts have made such considerations to some extent in the past. 320 The U.S. Supreme Court should
not be faulted for ultimately deciding each issue itself, regardless of the
possible weight of international opinion. It cannot hurt the Court, however, to keep an open mind about not only foreign domestic courts but
also international courts.
Conversely, domestic case law has long served to educate international tribunals. One accepted source of international law is the set of
315. The exception is the recent case in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordered that a petitioner was entitled to a new hearing, after which the
governor commuted his sentence. For a description of the LaGrand decision, see

supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
316. For a discussion of the pragmatic reasons for judicial consideration of
executive views, see supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
317. Slaughter, supra note 130, at 62 (extolling benefits of communication
between courts).
318. Id. at 69 (noting indifference and ignorance in United States towards
other nations' law) (quoting MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 158 (1991)).
319. Courts in other countries often study the opinions of our courts, particularly as to constitutional issues. See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REiv. 537, 537 (1988) (describing American
influence on courts in Europe and elsewhere).
320. For a compilation of Supreme Court decisions that have considered
treaty interpretations of foreign domestic courts, see supranote 248 and accompanying text.
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"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."3 2 1 In that vein,
the International Court has on occasion formulated doctrines of international law, on subjects including treaty interpretation, 3 22 based on principles of domestic law3 2 3 enunciated by courts such as the U.S. Supreme
Court.3 2 4 In short, the effect of domestic and international courts on each
other has been, and should continue to be, reciprocal. A two-way flow of
influence reflects that U.S. courts and the International Court occupy parallel universes, with neither hierarchically above the other.3 25 Treaties
need not be interpreted the same way in each system, but even precedent
that is not binding can sometimes be persuasive.
Recently, though the U.S. Supreme Court has not embraced International Court judgments, it has been sprinkling its opinions with citations
to international and foreign law. 326 Though that trend has prompted sev321. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 155, art. 38, para. 1 (c).
322. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1997 I.C.J. 243, 282-83 (Dec. 17)
(separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) ("[tilt is appropriate to mention . ..the
treatment of the analogous problem within national legal systems .... ") (quoting
two United States cases to assist in interpretation of Rules of Court). The International Court has also cited the works of noted American commentators. See, e.g.,
Request for an Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.CJ.
288, 417 (Sept. 22) (Palmer, J., dissenting) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEIL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 160 (June 27) (separate opinion
of Judge Lachs) (citing work by Oliver Wendell Holmes).
323. See, e.g., Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960
I.CJ. 6, 66-67 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Judge Koo) (citing comparative law
study showing that under municipal law, private individuals have right to access
enclaved properties and noting that same principle dictates that states have right
of passage to enclaved territories); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. 4,
22-23 (Apr. 6) (relying on domestic nationality laws to determine whether naturalization in Liechtenstein had international effect). But see Wolfgang Friedmann,
The Uses of "GeneralPrinciples" in the Development of InternationalLaw, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 279, 280-81 (1963) (chiding International Court for its reluctance to develop
general principles of law based on domestic sources). As one observer put it,
"principles of equity and fairness found in national legal systems have played a
significant role in the development of international law." Pippa Tubman, National
Jurisprudence in International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 65, at 107, 145.
324. See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1066
(Dec. 13) (citing discussion about how to measure width of river in Vermont v. New
Hampshire,289 U.S. 593, 619 (1933)); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 160
(Dec. 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge McNair) (quoting elaboration of law of
territorial waters in United States v. California,332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947)).
325. The International Court has on occasion determined principles of international law based on domestic courts' decisions about the content of international law. Bassiouni, supra note 299, at 789 (listing variety of sources of general
principles).
326. For example, in support of its holding that the Due Process Clause protects the right to engage in private sexual acts between consenting adults, the
Court noted that "[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as
an integral part of human freedom in many other countries." Lawrence v. Texas,
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327
eral dozen federal legislators to introduce a resolution condemning it,
the Court's willingness to engage the international community is welcome,
as long as it stops short of formal deference. The Court has been strengthening its international ties in other ways as well. In 2004, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy participated in a two-day workshop to advise Iraqi
judges how to unite Iraq's disparate regions through a centralized, independent judiciary. 32 8 One good lesson for judges in Iraq-or in the
United States-would be that courts can be independent without being
isolated.

V.

CONCLUSION

Isolation from international tribunals has been an unwritten policy of
U.S. courts. Dependence on the executive branch has been a written one.
539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21
(2002) ("[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (examining decisions from several European countries on grounds that "their
experience may ...cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem").
In Lawrence, the Court specifically relied on the holding of the European
Court of Human Rights that a law prohibiting consensual homosexual conduct was
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights. See Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 573, 576 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). Justice
Scalia strongly disagreed with the relevance of the European decision. Id. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling citation of foreign views " [ d]angerous dicta"). SeveralJustices have taken the unusual step of defending that citation informally. Justice Breyer supported it in a television interview, stating that the world is "growing
together." John H. Cushman Jr., O'Connor Indicates She Will Remain on Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A9. Justice O'Connor defended the international flavor of
Lawrence in a speech and predicted increased citation of foreign decisions: "I suspect that over time, we will rely increasingly-or take notice increasingly-on international and foreign law in resolving domestic disputes." Jonathan Ringel,
O'ConnorSpeech Puts Foreign Law Center Stage, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 31,
2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1067350962318. Likewise, Justice Ginsburg said in a speech to the American Constitution Society that
the Justices are "becoming more open to comparative and international law perspectives." Gina Holland, Ginsburg: InternationalLaw Shaped Court Rulings, AssociATED PRESS, Aug. 2, 2003, availableat http://www.americanconstitutionsociety.org/
pdf/AP3.pdf. She expressed the hope that the Court would in the future take
greater notice of the decisions of foreign courts. Id.
327. The resolution provides as follows:
[I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States should not
be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of
foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are incorporated into the legislative history of laws.., or otherwise
inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the
United States.
H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004).
328. See Iraq Gets Court Aid from 2 U.S. Justices,N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A20
(describing Justices' trip and issues addressed in Iraq).
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If courts pay less attention to executive interpretations of treaties and
more to international ones, they can better serve their constitutional function of applying treaties as domestic law. Formal deference to any other
body's interpretation amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority, but courts need not be cloistered. Though judgments of
the International Court ofJustice are by no means binding on U.S. courts,
they can be persuasive. Distant detachment helps neither judges in fulfilling their domestic duty nor the nation in promoting respect for interna329
tional law-which is, after all, "part of our law."
In interpreting international agreements, one should keep in mind
that there is no such thing as a treaty. A single document, or a single
provision, can have multiple meanings. Diverse institutional roles of interpreters can draw out those meanings. Thus, whether one thinks of treaties
as flexible orJanus-faced, one must never forget who is expounding them.
When it was the U.S. Department of State interpreting the Consular
Convention, the answer was that foreign nationals had no private right of
action. 330 That answer confined the treaty to the international plane, the
department's milieu. When it was the U.S. Supreme Court, the answer was
that even if the treaty conferred a private right of action, a separate provi3 31
sion allowed domestic procedural default rules to defeat that right.
That answer meshed with the Court's institutional interest in discouraging
33 2
federal habeas corpus litigation.
When it was the International Court of Justice, the answer was that
the convention did grant a private right of action that could not be
trumped by procedural default rules. 333 That answer gave the Supreme
Court a chance to reconsider its original interpretation, or at least to make
a show of doing so, by awaiting the International Court's final judgment.3 34 Only two justices, however, were willing to postpone an execu329. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that courts of
appropriate jurisdiction should apply international law when questions are "duly
presented").
330. For a description of U.S. courts' interpretation of the convention, see
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
331. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1998) (explaining impact of
procedural default on rights under convention).
332. See Ann Althouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal
Courts, 574 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 132, 135 (2001) (describing how
Court's jurisprudence on topics such as habeas corpus has advanced institutional
goal of conserving judicial resources).
333. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128,
40, 112-114 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/
idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imusjudgment_20040331.pdf;
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494, 497-98 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/
igus ijudgment_20010625.htm.
334. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2003 I.C.J. 1 59 (Feb. 5), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/
imusorder/ imus iorder_20030205.PDF (ordering United States to "take all meaPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
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33 5
As usual, the majority of the Court
don to await that final judgment.

33 6
The wait
breezily dismissed the significance of the International Court.
for a final judgment could have been a long one. But a reason for the
International Court's deliberate pace is that it examines treaties in much
more detail than the Supreme Court, issuing more richly analytical

opinions.
To be sure, the Supreme Court was not bound to obey any commands
or follow any precedent of the International Court. In applying treaties

within the United States, the Supreme Court is indeed supreme. It is not,
however, infallible. Prudence-not deference-suggests that before allowing an execution, waiting for the complete opinion of a juristic body
with particular competence in an area would be warranted.
In sum, difference among interpreters of treaties may be inevitable.
Deference is inappropriate. But independence need not spawn
indifference.
sures necessary to ensure that [three prisoners] are not executed pending final
judgment in these proceedings").
335. See Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari over two written dissents).

336. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (purporting to "give respectful consideration"
of International Court's views while disagreeing with its interpretation of Consular
Convention and refusing to abide by its order not to allow execution before final
judgment).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss1/2

62

